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Virtual Currencies in the Eurosystem:
Challenges Ahead
ROSA MARIA LASTRA* AND JASON GRANT ALLEN c '

This article is the slightly modified version of a policy contribution that
was prepared for the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs of the
European Parliament (ECON) as an input for the Monetary Dialogue of 9
July 2018 between ECON and the President of the European Central Bank
(http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/econ/monetary-dialogue
.html). Copyright remains with the European Parliament at all times.
I.

Introduction

Since the launch of Bitcoin in 2009, Virtual Currencies (VCs) utilizing
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), particularly 'blockchain' data
structures, have moved into mainstream awareness and onto the regulatory
agenda.' While VCs were not, in the early years, considered much of a risk
to either the financial or real economy or to monetary policy, developments
since 2017 have heightened central banks' and regulators' sense of
vigilance-particularly (i) Bitcoin's (brief) rise to nearly US $20,000 per
bitcoin, and (ii) the unprecedented volume of early venture capital raised in
Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) outside the regulated financial services
industry.2 At the time of writing, 1,604 VCs were listed on one prominent
website, with a nominal total market capitalization of US $419 billion.3
These are startling numbers because they have risen from zero since the
launch of Bitcoin in 2009, because a massive explosion in number and value
* LLB, MA (Valladolid), LLM (Harvard), PhD (Madrid); Sir John Lubbock Chair in
Banking Law, Professor in International Financial and Monetary Law at the Centre for

Commercial Law Studies (CCLS), Queen Mary University of London.
BA & LLB (UTas), LLM (Augsburg), GDLP (College of Law), PhD (Cantab.); Alexander
von Humboldt Foundation Post-Doctoral Fellow, Humboldt-Universitit zu Berlin
Grofibritannien-Zentrum; Visiting Fellow, UNSW Centre for Law Markets and Regulation;
Adjunct Research Fellow, University of Tasmania Faculty of Law; Member of the NY Bar and
Australian Lawyer (non-practicing).
1. See Dirk A.Zetzsche, Ross P. Buckley, Douglas W. Arner, & Linus Fohr, The ICO Gold
Rush: It's a Scam, It's a Bubble, It's a Super Challenge for Regulators 2-4 (European Banking

Institute, Working Paper Series 2017-011, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract id=3072298&download=yes.
2. See id. at 19. Bitcoin and Ether are of particular importance. See BITCOIN, https://bitcoin
.org/en/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2018); see also ETHER, https://www.ethereum.org (last visited Oct.
30, 2018).
3. See COIN MARKET
figure changes daily.

CAP,

https://coinmarketcap.com/, (last visited May 11, 2018). This
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has occurred in the past three years, and because, despite significant
volatility in the VC markets, these figures continue to grow.
The development of the VC market to date has largely been a matter of
private initiative, often motivated by a techno-libertarian ideological outlook
that stresses the private creation of money and adopts a skeptical position
towards state interference in economic arrangements generally, which
translates into a skeptical position towards central banks in particular.4
More recently, however, central banks around the world have begun to
explore the affordances of DLT as a source of new tools in monetary policy.
Questions exist about VCs' status, their role in the Eurosystem, and the
proper approach for regulators and central bankers to take. To date, most
regulators have adopted a 'watch and wait' strategy as the market develops5
in order not to stifle beneficial innovation-and bearing in mind that VCs
are a cross-border phenomenon. Certain jurisdictions have been more
proactive than others. The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC),
for example, has adopted a proactive but fairly permissive strategy focused
on applying the requirements for the valid issue of securities to these new
financial instruments; regulators in China and South Korea, on the other
hand, have placed a moratorium on ICOs.6 Thailand recently approved a
decree on digital assets. 7 Generally, the first wave of regulatory action has
been to warn consumers and to apply existing regulations to VCs. In the
next wave, we expect to see express regulation of VCs (and their related
technologies) directly, through various means; for example, the draft of
legislation currently slated in Malta.s
In this paper, we explore the challenges VCs might raise for central banks
in the Eurosystem, both in their money creation and oversight roles. The
structure of the paper is as follows: Section II defines VCs and the
technology on which they rest, differentiates VCs from more familiar
financial instruments such as cash, book-money, and e-money, and sets out
4. See generally Jon Baldwin, In digital we trust: Bitcoin discourse, digital currencies, and
decentralized network fetishism, PALGRAVE COMMC'N (2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/
s41599-018-0065-O.pdf.
5. See Marco Dell'Erba, Marco, Initial Coin Offerings. A Primer. The First Response of
Regulatory Authorities, N.Y.U J. OF L. & Bus. 3, (July 7, 2017), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=3063536.
,
6. See, e.g., Ff2 p~qp{ ,
[CHINA BANK INSURANCE SUPERVISION AND
ADMINISTRATION COMMISSION], (Nov. 4, 2018) http://www.cbrc.gov.cn/chinese/newlndex
.html (China), translated in Wolfie Zhao, China's ICO Ban: A Full Translation of Regulator
Remarks, COINDESK (Sept. 7, 2017 2:17 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/chinas-ico-ban-a-fulltranslation-of-regulator-remarks/.
7. 135 Raadchakidjaa [Royal Thai Gov't Gazette] pt.33a p. 43-70 (B.E. 2561, May 13, 2018),
translated in Emergency Decree on Digital Asset Businesses, LINKLATERS, https://www.sec.or
.th/EN/SECInfo/LawsRegulation/Documents/actandroya/digitaasset-decree-2561 -EN.pdf.
The Decree was published in the Government Gazette on 13 May 2018 and came into force on
14 May 2018. See Thailand enacts emergency decrees on digital assets, EY (May 21, 2018), https://
www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/international-tax/alert thailand-enacts-emergency-decreeson-digital-assets.
8. See, e.g., Virtual Financial Assets Act 2018, C778 (2018) (Malta).
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the features that differentiate VCs from each other in legally relevant ways.
This section is designed to highlight the legally-relevant features of VCs and
set the stage for a more detailed examination of VCs and monetary law in
Section III. We emphasize that it is more accurate to talk about 'cryptoassets' than about 'cryptocurrencies.' Further, we introduce in this section
the 'border problems' that VCs may raise as alternative financial instrument,
issued by new kinds of entities, which exist in a virtual realm that challenges
regulatory frameworks based on territorial jurisdiction. Finally, we explain
the ideological project that has driven the creation and early growth of VCs
and provide a sketch of earlier regulatory responses around the world.
Section III then explores the main challenges raised by privately issued
VCs. These are: (i) a direct challenge to the monetary sovereignty of central
banks in their money creation role, (ii) the threat of a vector of financial
contagion of systemic relevance to central banks in their oversight role, and
(iii) conceptual challenges to definitions (i.e. of categories such as 'money,'
'currency,' and 'security') that are presupposed in the distribution of
regulatory competence-but are, both as a matter of legal and economic
theory, contentious. Finally, we examine the challenges inherent in
regulating a revolution in financial technology, including the distribution of
regulatory tasks and combatting financial crime and tax evasion, and explore
the need for central banks to adopt technological tools themselves in order
to control new forms of technologically-mediated financial activity.
While the bulk of our analysis is concerned with privately issued VCs, in
Section IV we briefly address the challenges raised in the Eurosystem by the
prospect of central bank issued virtual currencies (CBVCs).9 Our
provisional analysis explores the reasons for which central banks might wish
to issue VCs, sets out the most important design features for central banks to
consider when doing so, and argues that national central banks (NCBs) in
the Eurosystem lack the competence to issue VCs unilaterally.
We conclude in Section V that VCs require a proactive regulatory
response and that certain VCs could warrant prohibition now or in the
future. Ideally, a harmonized European approach to the regulation of VCs is
desirable to prevent regulatory arbitrage by market participants and a 'race
to the bottom' by national regulators.
II.

Definition and Focus

Although it is reflexive to ask whether VCs are properly seen as 'currency'
or 'securities,' as further discussed below, it is not desirable to attempt to
place VCs into such legal categories at the outset. Legal categories are not
merely descriptive of reality, but prescribe what objects are legally
cognizable, often by means of a numerus clausus.IO The assignment of an
9. The term 'central bank digital currency' (CBDC) is more established in the literature, but
we use VC in keeping with the ECON Committee's terms of reference.
10. This begins at a fundamental level. For example, a Japanese court has ruled that bitcoins
are not cognizable as 'things' capable of ownership under Art. 85 of the Japanese Civil Code,
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object to one category (or none) initiates a whole cascade of further legal
consequences. A recurring theme in our analysis is that many VCs straddle
the traditional legal categories and possibly reveal conceptual problems with
those categories. In other words, legal categorization is a second step that
should only be taken once a descriptive apprehension of the subject matter is
gained."
A.

FINDING A TERMINOLOGY

Broadly defined, VC tokens are digital representationsof value.12 VC tokens
are used by some people as a means of payment for goods and services, but
many people use them primarily as a store of value that more approximates a
speculative asset than a unit of money. 3 Others function like vouchers for
access to software or other goods or services at a future date.'y
The literature is moving to distinguish, in particular, between (i) VCs
called 'currencies' because they are intended to function as such, (ii) VCs
more similar to traditional 'securities' or 'crypto-assets' and (iii) VCs that
provide access to an application or service, which are more similar to
vouchers (utility tokens). Further classes of VC token may emerge in the
future, but we consider that most innovations could be captured through the
creation of subcategories within the three first mentioned. The borders
between these categories are often permeable, the actual use of a VC token
may change over time, and VCs potentially raise some basic questions in the
definition of money, currency, securities, and commodities themselves.5
Definitions are important, but difficult, because legal categories such as
'money' sometimes overlap or stack in their economic function; for example,
traditional money systems used commodities (precious metal) as the token of
with consequences for the insolvency of a major VC exchange. See ]apan court rules against

Bitcoin compensation plea, BBC, (Aug. 7, 2015) https://www.bbc.com/news/technology- 338166
64; K
(
[CWLL CODE (PART I, PART II, AND PART III)], Act No. 89 of
1896, Art. 85, translatedin JAPANESE LAW TRANSLATION, http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go
.jp/law/detail/?id=2057&vm=04&re=02.(Japan). Several European codifications take a similar
approach to the definition of 'things'.
11. See, e.g., Jason G. Allen, Whats Offered in an ICO? Digital Coins as Things, SSRN, 1, 16, 23,

(Mar. 13, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3140499.
12. Some VCs are used not as a representation of value at all, but as the placeholder or storage
medium for some other information, for example recording intellectual property rights. We
will not consider these non-financial use cases in any detail.
13. See Salomon Fiedler, Klaus-Jurgen Gem, Dennis Herle, Stefan Kooths, Ulrich
Stolzenburg, Luci Stoppok, Virtual Currencies,EUROPEAN

PARLIAMENT, 10, (June, 2018),

http:/

/www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/149902/KIELFINAL / 20publication.pdf.
14. See Kenneth Rapoza, Is It Too Late To Make Your Fortune In CryptocurrencyICOs?, FORBES
(Feb. 8, 2018, 3:42 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2018/02/08/is-it-too-late-tomake -your- fortune -in-cryptocurrency-icos/#32bddcdl fa5f.
15. See Seoyoung Kim & Sumon Mazumdar, Cryptocurrencies Demystified and the SEC's
Regulatory Stance, ABA (Aug. 25 2018), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/
committees/securities/articles/2018/summer20l8 -cryptocurrencies-demystified-and-the -secsregulatory-stance/.
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the monetary unit, whereas modern 'fiat' systems use securities (banknotes, a
type of promissory note) as the token of the monetary unit.16 The advent of
VCs demands concretization of these definitions in a new and challenging
context.
Although we use the term 'VC,' we do not accept that any VC should
necessarily be called a 'currency.' Where it is necessary to distinguish the
individual unit of a VC from the totality of software and human organization
that creates and maintains it, we refer to the individual unit of a VC as a 'VC
token' as distinct from a 'VC scheme.' Our analysis focuses on VCs that
function (or could function) in a manner of systemic relevance to the
Eurosystem, in respect both of central banks' role in the creation and
management of money and in their oversight of the financial and monetary
system. But so far VCs-understood as 'crypto-assets'-are characterized in
national legal terms in the Eurosystem, as we further explore in Section 2.
Further, as a class of securities (or an analogue of securities), 'crypto-assets'
may be of significance to central banks' oversight of the financial system.
B.

DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY

The VCs that have come to our attention in recent years are all based on
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT), a relatively new, and rapidly
evolving, approach to recording and sharing data across multiple data
stores.17 A distributed ledger is a database for storage of data (including
executable programs) that is replicated over a peer-to-peer network and that
enables multiple parties to share the database and modify data (i.e. effect
transactions) in a safe and secure way, even if they don't know or trust each
other.s DLT came into the spotlight with the 2009 launch of Bitcoin on the
world's first operational 'blockchain.' A blockchain is a form of DLT data
structure that (i) records transactions across a distributed network of
computers, (ii) combines data about the subject matter of the transaction
(including previous transactions) with data about the transferee and
transferor in a 'block' in a 'chain,' (iii) uses cryptographic means to prevent
tampering with the chain, and (iv) relies on nodes in the network to verify
16. See Jason Hall, Fiat Currency: What it is and Why It's Better Than a Gold Standard, THE
FOOL (Dec. 5th 2015, 6:00 AM) https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/12/06/
fiat-currency-what-it-is-and-why-its-better-than-a.aspx.
17. See Work Bank Group, DistributedLedger Technology (DLT) and Blockchain, THE WORLD
BANK
(2017), IV, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/177911513714062215/pdf/
122140- WP-PUBLIC-Distributed-Ledger-Technology-and-Blockchain-Fintech-Notes.pdf.
While every blockchain is a DLT, not every DLT is a blockchain. See Philip Treleaven, Richard
Gendal Brown, and Danny Yang, Blockchain technology in Finance, IEEE COMPUTER Soc'Y, 15
(Sept. 2017) https://www.computer.org/csdl/mags/co/2017/09/mco2Ol709OO14.pdf.
18. Dr. Garrick Hileman and Marcel Rauchs, Global Blockchain Benchmarking Study,
CA MBRIDGE CENTRE FOR ALT. FIN., 13, (2017), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/
ey-global-blockchain-benchmarking-study-2017/$File/ey-global- blockchain-benchmarkingstudy-2017.pdf.
MOTLEY
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transactions, often through some kind of game-theory informed incentive
mechanism.19
Not everything that matches the description of a VC utilizes this kind of
data structure. There are also digital representations of value that are kept
in centralized 'accounts' and circulate within the game-world of a Massive
Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games (MMORPGS) such as Linden
Labs' Second Life. So-called Linden Dollars (L$), for example, are the
currency of a significant economy 20 which interacts with the 'real' economy
in various ways." These 'VCs' have some historical connection to our
subject matter-for example, the insolvent VC exchange 'Mt. Gox' began its
life as a MMORPG-related exchange.22 L$ and similar VCs are not, in our
view, significant to the Eurosystem; they do, however, serve as a useful
counterpoint when considering the interaction between 'virtual' financial
systems and the 'real-world' financial system, not least because they are the
subject of an emergent literature in their own right.
C.

VCs AND EXISTING FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS

It is useful at the outset to compare VCs with existing financial
instruments (broadly construed), as VCs display a number of hybrid features.
The 'world of alternatives' contains alternatives to money/currency,
alternatives to credit/finance (such as peer-to-peer lending platforms and
crowdfunding) and alternatives to payments/exchange. VCs sit somewhere
in between the alternatives to money and the alternatives to payments/
exchange, while exhibiting features of securities (crypto-assets). This
complex characterization does not fit easily with established legal concepts.
VCs resemble currency (i.e. cash, consisting of banknotes and coins) in that
they are (typically) exchanged 'peer-to-peer' in a decentralized manner
rather than through the accounting system of a central institution.23 To date,
19. See id. at 15.
20. See id. at 13-16, 21.
21. In 2010, the Second Life economy peaked at about USD 500 million GDP. Martin Bryant,

Think Second Life died? It has a higher GDP than some countries, THE NEXT WEB, (Nov. 7, 2015),
https://thenextweb.com/insider/2015/11/07/think-second-life-died-it-has-a-higher-gdp-thansome-countries/.
22. L$ are directly purchased with USD using conventional payment channels such as credit
card. L$ are also tradable for USD and other VCs (including other in-game VCs) on
exchanges. See Rob Berger, How to Earn a Second Income in Your 'Second Life,' DOUGH ROLLER,
(Nov. 5, 2017), https://www.doughroller.net/earn-extra-income/how-to-earn-a-secondincome -in-your-second-life/. The USD:L$ exchange rate fluctuates, but generally sits around
250:1. See id. L$ are bought and sold offline in so-called 'real world trades.' Id. From 2008,
VAT has been charged on income (in L$) from in-game assets purchased from Linden Labs by
European customers. See SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/corporate/vat.php (last visited
Nov. 4, 2018).
23. To date, most non-currency payment systems use some kind of central accounting and
clearing system, with the exception of some e-money systems that store value locally on a
'smart' card or device. On currency-based, account-based, and note-based payment systems, see

J.S. Rogers, The New Old Law of Electronic Money, 58 SMU L.

REV.

1253 (2005), available at
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non-cash payment systems have generally used some kind of central clearing,
while Bitcoin was presented as an 'electronic cash' system. 24 But VCs are
distinguished from currency (i) in that they are created, transferred, and
stored digitally rather than physically, (ii) in that they are issued by a private
entity rather than a central bank or other public authority, and (iii) in that
they are not 'legal tender.'
Some VCs like Bitcoin resemble commodities, including commodity-based
currency systems like the gold standard, bi-metallism (gold and silver), and
even the par value regime or gold-USD standard adopted by the original
IMF Articles of Agreement,25 in that supply is limited and by definition
subject to great volatility and potential speculation if the demand far exceeds
supply. On the other hand, a commodity like gold has an intrinsic value26
and a physical representation, while VCs exist in 'virtual' reality only. The
only commodity in a VC like bitcoin is a 'chain of digital signatures,' i.e. a
r
set of data that looks as much like an accounting ledger as a 'token'.2
Some VCs resemble cashless, account-based payment systems such as
'book money'28 or bank deposits, because they are electronic representations of
value issued by a private entity. But VCs differ from book money (i) because
no system of reserve is necessarily in place in any VC scheme, (ii) because
there is no central bank to act as lender of last resort, and (iii) because VCs
are not necessarily the liability of any person, whereas book money is, by
definition, the liability of a commercial bank.29
https://awdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&
httpsredir= &article=103 9&context=lsfp According to FATF, 'Virtual Currencies Key
Definitions and Potential AML-CFT Risks' (2014) http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/reports/Virtual- currency- key-definitions -and -potential -aml-cft- risks.pdf. (p.4):
"virtual currency is a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and functions as
(1) a medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a store of value, but does not
have legal tender status in any jurisdiction..."
24. See generally Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-PeerElectronic Cash System, BITCOIN,
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
25. The value of currency of each participating member was defined in terms of gold or
alternatively in terms of the US Dollar of July 1, 1944, which had a fixed gold value equal to

USD 35. See Michael D. Bordo & Robert N. McCauley, Triffin: dilemma or myth?, Bank for
InternationalSettlements, 3 (Bank for International Settlements, Working Paper, No. 684, 2017),
https://www.bis.org/publ/work684.pdf.
26. Indeed, one of the reasons for the collapse of the par value regime was that there was a
private market in addition to the public gold-USD standards and the value of gold in the private
market kept increasing from the 1940s to the 1970s when the Bretton Woods par value regime
was finally abandoned. See, e.g., ROSA MARiA LASTRA, INT'L FIN. AND MONETARY L. 407, Ch.
12, (2015).
27. See Nakamoto, supra note 24.
28. 'Book money' (often derived from German Buchgeld) refers to bank deposits that function,
in an account-based payment system such as a giro, as quanta of 'money'. See Bank Giro
Transfer, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bankgirotransfer.asp (last
visited Oct. 23, 2018).

29. See Anna Issac, Future of Bitcoin limited by having no lender of last resort, BNP Paris claims,
3:10 PM) https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2017/11/
20/future-bitcoin-limited-having-no-lender-last-resort-bnp-paribas/; see also James Surowiecki,
PUBLISHED IN COOPERATION WITH
SMU DEDMAN SCHOOL OF LAW
THE TELEGRAPH, (Nov. 20, 2017,

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
A TRIANNUAL PUBLICATION OF THE ABA/SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
184

[VOL. 52, NO. 2

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

VCs also approximate electronic money30 and private payment systems such
as PayPal insofar as they are digital representations of value that are issued
by private entities and move outside the more traditional intermediaries of
the payment system (i.e. commercial banks).31 But PayPal credit and
electronic money are (i) both denominated in a 'sovereign fiat' unit of
account, (ii) are, again, by definition the liability of a known, licensed
entity.32 Innovations in payment systems like M-Pesa in Kenya are different
from the notion of VCs in that they rely also on fiat money and are rooted in
obligational relationships.33 VCs understood as alternatives to currency are
not fiat money and are not legal tender, nor are they based on fiat money in
this way.
VCs are, thus, distinguishable from the conventional types of financial
instrument in a number of ways, but particularly by (i) their use of DLT (in
particular blockchain data structures) to facilitate peer-to-peer exchange; (ii)
their issuance by an entity outside the traditional monetary system of central
banks, commercial banks, and licensed financial intermediaries; (iii) their
34
denomination in a novel unit of account rather than a fiat monetary unit.
D.

DIFFERENTIATING VCs

VCs differ according to (i) the technical features chosen by developers and
(ii) the way that VC tokens behave as economic objects in the market. 35
Here, we provide an overview of what are, in our view, the most important
differentiators, and explain their legal and policy relevance. We treat
technical and economic features together, as the choice of a technical
parameter is not an economically neutral one. For example, the choice to
limit the total number of bitcoins that will be created on the Bitcoin
blockchain has two economic implications: first, it creates incentives for
Bicoin would be a calamity, not an economy, MIT TECH. REV., (April 10, 2018) https://www
.technologyreview.com/s/610783/bitcoin-would-be-a-calamity-not-an-economy/.
30. Council Directive 2009/110, 2009 O.J. (L 267) 8 (EC).
31. See Surowiecki, supra note 29.
32. See Report on Electronic Money, EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, 15 (Aug. 1998), https://www
.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/emoneyen.pdf; see Gareth 'W. Peters, Efstathios Panayi, & Ariane
Chapelle, Trends in cryptocurrencies and blockchain technologies: a monetary theory and regulation
perspective, J. OF FIN. PERSP. 7 (2015).
33. See generally Claire Alexandre, 10 Things You Thought You Knew about M-PESA, CGAP
(Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.cgap.org/blog/10-things-you-thought-you-knew-about-m-pesa.

34. See Central bank digitalcurrencies, BANK FOR INT'L

SETTLEMENTS

5-6 (Mar. 2018), https://

www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d174.pdf; EBA Opinion on 'virtual currencies,' EUROPEAN BANKING
AUTH., EBA/Op/2014/08, 11-12, https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/657547/EBAOp-2014-08+Opinion+on+Virtual+Currencies.pdf. A table of comparisons is annexed to the
original report on which this paper is based. See Rosa Maria Lastra & Jason Grant Allen,
Virtual Currencies in the Eurosystem: Challenges Ahead, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, 52 (July 9,
2018), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/150541/DIWFINAL / 20publication.pdf.
35. See generally Arjun Kharpal, All you need to know about the top 5 cryptocurrencies,
CNBC (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/14/bitcoin-ether-litecoin-rippledifferences-between-cryptocurrencies.html.
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users to hoard bitcoins as speculative assets rather than spending them as a
medium of exchange; second, if Bitcoin were to achieve monetary status
within an economy despite this feature, it would eventually cause price
volatility as the rigid money supply interacted with an expanding or
contracting real economy. (Indeed, this seems to have been the intention of
its creator(s)).
The following list provides a high-level overview. We will return to the
most important points in more depth in the course of our substantive
analysis in the sections to follow.
i. Who issued the VC? Is the issuer public or private? How is the
issuer organized and governed? (So far VC issuers have been
overwhelmingly private entities. As a new category of financial entities,
they fit poorly with traditional capital markets and prudential
regulation.)
ii. Is the VC software proprietary or open-source? How is the
software developed and distributed? Who is responsible for, e.g.,
security updates or responding to cyber-attacks?
iii. Where was the VC issued? How do existing national, regional,
and international regimes of consumer protection, prudential
regulation, capital control, tax evasion, anti-money-laundering, etc.,
apply to it?
iv. How does the VC operate in the market? What is its (i) intended
and (ii) actual economic function?
v. Who maintains the VC's ledger, and how? Does the VC utilize a
'trustless' (or 'permissionless') system or do some nodes have special
authorization to update the ledger? How does this affect the VC
scheme's internal governance?
vi. Are users of the VC 'anonymous' (actually pseudonymous) or
identified with 'real-world' data points?
vii. Is the VC backed with a reserve of real-world assets? Are VC
tokens pure 'digital commodities' or do they represent (i) tangible
commodity or (ii) a reserve of fiat currency?
viii. How does the VC interact with the real-world financial
economy? Are VC tokens convertible, and if so how? What
intermediaries are at the interface between the VC and the real-world
economy?
ix. How do users hold and trade the VC? Do they hold VC tokens
directly in a 'wallet' (e.g. computer storage device) or are 'their' tokens
held by a fiduciary intermediary? Are trades recorded 'on-chain' in real
time or are trades effected 'off-chain' followed by a settlement
procedure? What role do the 'tokens' play in the technical functioning
of the accounting system?
x. How is the volume of the VC supply determined? Are the decisions
taken by humans or are they algorithmic? Are those algorithms subject
to change? By whom? What factors are taken into account?
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BORDER PROBLEMS

A metaphor of border problems guides our analysis. Goodhart and Lastra
explore the two main borders in the aftermath of the 2008 Global Financial
Crisis: (i) the border between regulated and unregulated entities, and
between regulated and unregulated activities, and (ii) the border between
national jurisdictions.36
When the border between the regulated and the unregulated is punctured,
the regulated economy faces risks originating in the unregulated space. The
border becomes problematic when (i) unregulated entities start engaging in
regulated activities (such as an ICO that amounts to a securities issue) or (ii)
regulated entities start engaging in unregulated activities (such as a regulated
financial services provider trading in VCs or using VCs as the underlying
asset of a regulated product, such as a collective investment scheme). Such
border crossovers increase the risk of contagion, for example when a
liquidity crisis in the unregulated space affects a regulated entity's position in
the regulated space.
Transactions in VCs constitute a new frontier of financial activity: VC
schemes may constitute 'grey' currency issues, securities issues, and payment
rails, for example, which operate in parallel to traditional (regulated)
financial services. Much can be done to enforce this border by extending it.
For example, the United States Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) has
taken a proactive stance by treating many ICOs as the issue of securities
despite their issuers' attempt to avoid engaging in a regulated activity at all.37
US regulators have also been proactive in applying certain banking
regulations to VC-based payments providers.38 In general, however,
regulated activities are defined in legal instruments that typically predate the
advent of DLT and VCs. Unregulated activities undertaken by unregulated
entities can pose a challenge for regulators to the extent that they ought to be
regulated on grounds such as investor protection, financial crime prevention,
or to maintain monetary sovereignty (e.g. by applying anti-counterfeiting
laws to alternative currency schemes39), but it is not always straightforward
to apply existing regulatory frameworks to them. For example, there may be
disagreement between regulators and courts as to the nature of certain VCs
under existing banking, securities, or commodities trading legislation.
With regard to the second border problem, Goodhart and Lastra observe
that the transnational nature of financial activity and the national basis of
36. Charles A. E. Goodhart & Rosa M. Lastra, Border Problems, 13(3) J.

INT'L

ECON. L. 705

(2010).
37. See, e.g., SEC, No. 81207,

REP. OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 21(A) OF THE

1934: THE DAO 1, 2, 11 (2017), https://www.sec.gov/
litigation/investreport/34- 81207.pdf.
38. See, e.g., I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. FIN-2013-GOOI (Mar. 18, 2013), https://www
.fincen.gov/sites/default/files/shared/FIN-2013 -GOO .pdf.
39. This was the fate of the 'Liberty Dollar' and 'E-gold'. For a libertarian critique, see
generally, Kevin Dowd, New Private Monies: A Bit-Part Player?, INSTIT. OF ECON. AFFAIRS,
(2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2535299.
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF
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regulatory oversight can encourage sub-optimal outcomes. 40 VCs are, again,
by nature trans-jurisdictional and make national regulations more difficult to
enforce. This compounds with the first border problem because, for
example, there may not be a readily identifiable entity in any jurisdiction
which can easily be brought under national jurisdiction.
These border problems are exacerbated by a third border-that between
'cyberspace' and the 'real world.' Some VC schemes purport to create a new
41
form of business entity that operates in a non-jurisdictional space.
Developers are working on automated, decentralized applications that
replace traditional corporate structures in ways that disrupt conventional
oversight models and pose real risks of corporate governance and market
abuse.42 For example, 'The DAO' is a collective investment vehicle
structured as a 'Distributed Autonomous Organization,'43 a kind of
organization supposedly without human organs, which came to prominence
in 2016 when it was subject to a large-scale hacking attack. 44
In a seminal article from the mid-1990s, Johnson and Post argued that,
because modern computer-based communications systems cut across
territorial borders, undermining the connection between legally significant
online phenomena and physical locations, we need to develop laws adapted
to a 'space' bounded by screens and passwords instead of geographical
borders. 4s While we do not endorse this kind of argument, we do think that
VCs underline the urgency of re-thinking axioms such as jurisdiction and
territoriality to discover their contemporary relevance,46 and call for a
fundamental re-examination of legal conceptions such as 'ownership' and
'possession' in the context of immaterial assets such as VC tokens.47 Some of
these questions are novel, while others are long-standing.48
40. See Goodhart & Lastra, supra note 36, at 6.

41. See Primavera De Filippi, We Must Regulate Bitcoin. Problem Is, We Don't Understand It,
(Mar. 1, 2016, 1:09 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/must-understand-bitcoinregulate/.
42. See Aaron Wright & Primavera De Filippi, DecentralizedBlockchain Technology And The Rise
ofLex Cryptographia,SSRN, 3 (Mar. 12, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
WIRED

id=2580664.
43. See, e.g., Vitalik Buterin, DAOs, DACs, DAs and More: An Incomplete Terminology Guide,
ETHERELM BLOG, (May 6, 2014), https://blog.ethereum.org/2014/05/06/daos-dacs-das-andmore-an-incomplete-terminology-guide/; The DAO of Accrue, THE ECONOMIST, (May 19,
2016), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2016/05/19/the-dao-of-accrue.
44. It is controversial whether the event was a 'hack,' but the majority of The DAO
community seems to have taken the view that it was. See, e.g., David Siegel, Understanding the
DAO Attack, COINDESK, (June 27, 2016), https://www.coindesk.com/understanding-dao-hack-

journalists/.
45. David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48
STANFORD L. REV. 1367, 1370, 1378 (1996).
46. See David G. Post, How the Internet is making jurisdiction sexy (again), 25(4) INT'L J. L. &
INFo. TECH. 248 (2017).
47. See Allen, supra note 11, at 1, 15, 21.
48. It is a novel question how I 'possess' a bitcoin on a distributed ledger. Bitcoin, for

example, is a 'protocol for the allocation of permissions, which are denominated in bitcoins, and
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These three borders are important because they frame the strategy that
has been taken by many regulators in the early days of the VC market, which
has been to 'watch and wait' and to begin with the analogic application of
existing regulations. But many financial regulations presuppose (and are
directed towards) financial intermediaries. While analogic reasoning and
teleological interpretation can go some way to bringing new market
practices and technologies under existing norms, and while their application
to certain VCs will be easier than others, 49 this approach may be exhausted
before an optimal regulatory position is reached.
For example, in a 2014 Opinion on VCs, the European Banking Authority
(EBA) recommended a 'shielding' approach until such time as a
comprehensive European regime is established for regulating VCs. 50 This
approach accepts the fact that only risks that arise in the interaction between
VC schemes and the regulated financial services sector can be mitigated;
risks internal to VC schemes cannot. 51 The containment aspect of the
strategy consists in the EBA's position that national supervisory authorities
should discourage regulated entities from "buying, holding, or selling VCs,
thereby 'shielding' regulated financial services from VCs."52 Another
regulatory measure is to reinforce the borders through voluntary compliance
by constructing 'sandboxes' in which VC developers can innovate safelyand under the supervision of the regulator.53
The shielding approach is only as strong as the borders between regulated
and unregulated activities and entities. Especially where new activities and
entities spring up in cyberspace, bright lines are difficult to maintain. VCs
present an acute 'cyberspace border problem' because they may not even
have a readily identifiable issuing or controlling entity at all (as in the case of
Bitcoin). As a distributed software application, Bitcoin will prove itself to be
quite resilient against any direct regulatory efforts so long as a community of
users exist who ascribe value to the application's functions5 4 In our view,
tied to system-specific addresses,' but it is unclear what this means for the private monetary law
of any given jurisdiction. See PAUL ANNING, ET AL., THE LAW OF BITCOIN, 185 (Smart

Hoegner ed., 2015). But the question how I 'possess' a corporate bond on Clearstream or a
euro in my (electronic) bank account is not completely straightforward either. P. J. Rogerson,
The Situs of Debts in the Conflict of Laws Illogical, Unnecessary andMisleading, 49(3)

CAMBRIDGE

L.J. 441 (1990); see, e.g., Joseph H. Sommer, Where is a Bank Account?, 57 MD. L. REv. 1 (1998).
49. For example, the application of payment services laws to intermediaries that hold VC

tokens on behalf of users and process trades off-chain would appear to be more straightforward
than the application of the laws to VC tokens held directly by users and processed only onchain.
50. EBA Opinion on 'virtual currencies,' supra, note 34, at 44.
51. See id. at 6.
52. See id. at 44.
53. See, e.g., FinTech Regulatory Sandbox,

MONETARY

ATTH.

OF SINGAPORE,

http://www

.mas.gov.sg/Singapore- Financial- Centre/Smart- Financial- Centre/FinTech- Regulatory- Sand
box.aspx (last modified Jan. 9, 2017).
54. See, Nassia Matsa, MBA view: will bitcoin regulation undermine its value?, FIN. TIMES (May
16, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/5a9d757e-5836- le8-bdb7-f6677d2elce8; see also Yves
Mersch, Member of the Executive Board of ECB, Speech at the 39th meeting of the Governor's
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these border problems make regulation at the European level especially
important. This brings into relief questions about the division of
responsibilities and competences in the Eurosystem concerning the
regulation and oversight of privately issued VCs and concerning the
potential issuance of central bank-issued VCs.
F.

THE POLITICS OF THE CRYPTOCURRENCY MOVEMENT

The architecture of the modern monetary system and the political
economy it expresses have evolved from the early-modern birth of central
banking,55 and the rise of VCs coincides with a dispersed but growing
dissatisfaction with the existing monetary system. It is no coincidence that
Bitcoin was launched in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 crisis, to which
governments and central banks responded with unconventional monetary
policies, or that Bitcoin embodies an express attempt to replace fiat money
with a peer-to-peer payment system denominated in a digital token whose
scarcity is algorithmically secured against political interference. The rise of
VCs thus exacerbates a long-standing disagreement in macro-economic
policy regarding the desirability of a flexible money supply and of the
optimal degree of political influence over the creation of money.5 6 The
pendulum has shifted throughout history from flexibility to stability and
from stability to flexibility when it comes to monetary and exchange rate
policies. With regard to the latter, the case for flexibility was forcefully
made by Milton Friedman in a seminal contribution in 1953,5 7 at a time in
which exchange rate stability was the foundation of the IMF par value
regime and has been, of course, a key rationale for the adoption of the euro.
But some argue that flexibility in exchange rate policy (in particular, the
possibility of devaluating a national currency) could have been a useful policy
instrument for some of the Eurozone Member States affected by the recent
sovereign debt crisis had they kept their own national currencies. It is also
interesting to observe that the preamble to the US Federal Reserve Act talks
about the objective "to furnish an elastic currency," not a stable currency
(even though subsequent revisions to the Act have added the objective of
stability with the establishment of the Federal Open Market Committee in
1933).
Bitcoin is not regulated by any authority; the supply of bitcoins is based on
an algorithm which structures its decentralized peer-to-peer transaction
Club Bodrum, Turkey (May 14, 2018), (transcript available https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/
key/date/2018/html/ecb.spl 80514.en.html).
55. See

CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY:

CAPITALISM

(2015); see also

LASTRA,

COIN, CURRENCY,

AND THE COMING OF

supra note 26, at 29.

56. See Max Raskin & David Yermack, Digital Currencies, Decentralized Ledgers, and the Future
of Central Banking 1 (National Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22238, 2016).

57.

157 (1953).
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system. 58 This feature of Bitcoin (and many of its 'Altcoin' successors) is
often praised within a broadly American libertarian interpretation of the
Austrian School of economics, i.e. one that minimizes the role of political
decision-making in determining the money supply, that posits money as
something almost naturally occurring and politically neutral, emphasizes
commodity scarcity as a counter to inflation, and praises competition
59
between currencies.
Even more broadly, this ties into an ideology in which human institutions
(such as governments and central banks) are to be replaced by deterministic
technological processes that provide a neutral and self-sustaining framework
for individual flourishing.60 The radical possibilities of this project are
currently compounded by the promise of Artificial Intelligence (Al). Bitcoin
evangelists typically position themselves as underdogs and outsiders, 'cypher
punks' who aim to transform society through the use of disruptive
technologies rather than direct political mobilization. The VC movement
can thus be seen as the latest technological instantiation of a broader project
called by some scholars the 'Californian Ideology.'61 This is an eclectic
ideology and its elements are not distributed homogeneously through the
VC movement. 62 In broad terms, however, it is the product of the collision
and synthesis of neo-liberalism, counter-culture radicalism, and
technological determinism.63 With all the internal contradictions that
entails, the California Ideology combines a New Left anti-corporate ethos
and faith in the Internet as a forum for new forms of community with a
conservative libertarian faith in the ability of information technologies to
facilitate voluntary exchange between individuals outside the sphere of state
control.64 Needless to say, the libertarian strand of this movement is
inimical both to national and supra-national monetary policy and to
65
conventional financial institutions and structures.
While this is a significant aspect of the VC movement, it is important not
give this ideological project too much credence. Actors with more
58. Derek A. Dion, I'll Gladly Trade You Two Bits on Tuesdayfor a Byte Today: Bitcoin Regulating
Fraud in the E-conomy of Hacker-Cash, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 165, 167 (2013); see
generally, Nakamoto, supra note 24.
59. See, e.g., Charles A.E. Goodhart, The two concepts of money: implicationsfor the analysis of
optimal curreny areas, 14 EUR. J. POL. 407 (1998).
60. See, e.g., Primavera di Filippi & Benjamin Loveluck, The Invisible Politics of Bitcoin:
Governance Crisis of a DecentralisedInfrastructure, 5 INTERNET POLICY REV. 3, (Sept. 30, 2016),
https://policyreview.info/node/427/pdf; Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost of
Inflexibility, 166 U. PA. L. REv. 263 at 270.
61. See Richard Barbrook & Andy Cameron, The Californian Ideology, MtTE (Sept. 1,1995),
http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/californian-ideology.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. An idea of the literature influential on this demographic is gleaned from the reading list of
the self-styled 'Satoshi Nakamoto Institute.' See Literature, SATOSHI NAKAMOTO INST., https://
nakamotoinstitute.org/literature/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
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conventional economic motivations are increasingly attracted to launch VC
schemes or purchase VC tokens, and we expect these players to behave in
more conventional ways. 66 Further, DLT offers possibilities for
governmental actors including NCBs and the ECB, as well.67 Taking the
techno-libertarian manifestos at face value potentially distracts from the
challenges and opportunities of DLT within conventional political,
economic, and legal structures.
Despite the libertarian rhetoric, VC schemes have a political economy,
and a sociological picture of it is gradually emerging.68 An early Opinion by
the EBA, for example, identified the following players involved in the
creation and maintenance of a VC scheme: (i) users, (ii) merchants, (iii) VC
exchanges, (iv) scheme governance authorities (often highly informal), (v)
trade platforms, (vi) processing service providers, (vii) wallet providers/
custodians, (viii) inventors, (ix) technical service providers, (x) information
providers, and (xi) miners.69 Events such as the Mt. Gox insolvency Oand the
DAO 'hack'71 illustrate that this political economy is substantially shaped by
human decision-making.
A more recent, comprehensive benchmarking survey by Hileman and
Rauchs found that VCs introduced four new categories of financial industry
player into the landscape: (i) exchanges, (ii) wallets, (iii) payments service
providers, and (iv) miners.72 The most important players in this political
economy are VC exchanges. These are the sites at which most users
participate in the VC economy by purchasing VC tokens, either with other
VC tokens or with units of fiat currency. 3 As the channel of convertibility,
these are probably the most important potential vector of financial
contagion into the mainstream financial system. 74 At the time of the study,
Europe had the largest number of exchanges, so appropriate regulation
66. See Chance Barnett, Inside the Meteoric Rise of ICOs, FORBES (Sept. 23, 2017), https://www
.forbes.com/sites/chancebarnett/2017/09/23/inside-the-meteoric-rise-of-icos/#2ae3 1f65670c.
67. See DistributedLedger Technology, EUROPEAN CENT. BANK (2018), https://www.ecb.europa
•eu/pub/annual/special- features/2016/html/index.en.html.
68. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Institutionalized Disruption: The Rise of the Reformer Startup, 12

Bus. L.J. 1 at 4, 8-9.
69. EBA Opinion on Virtual Currencies, EuROPEAN

HASTINGS

BANKING AUTH.

at 13 -15 (July 4, 2014),

https://www.eba.europa.eu/documents/10180/657547/EBA-Op-2014-08+Opinion+on+Virtual
+Currencies.pdf
70. See Alexandra Harney & Steve Stecklow, Twice Burned - How Mt. Gox's Bitcoin Customers
Could Lose Again, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/specialreport/bitcoin-gox/.
71. See Joon Ian Wong &Ian Kar, Everything You Need To Know About the Ethereum HardFork,
QUARTZ (July 18, 2016), https://qz.com/730004/everything-you-need-to-know-about-theethereum-hard-fork/.
72. See Garrick Hileman & Michel Rauchs, 2017 Global Blockchain Benchmarking Study,
CA MBRIDGE CENTRE FOR ALT.

FIN. at 27 (Sept. 22, 2017) https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers

.cfm?abstract id=3040224.
73. See EBA Opinion on Virtual Currencies, supra note 69, at 14.
74. See id.
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would seem to be particularly important here. 75 In particular, exchanges that
hold VC tokens on behalf of their users and offer ancillary services are a
priority, as they pose the greatest risk of market abuse and/or financial
contagion.76
Hileman and Rauchs also found that the lines between these players were
blurred, and that there was currently a trend of convergence towards
'universal' VC businesses.77 Increasingly, this political economy is also
involving traditional financial institutions, for example as investment funds
look to VCs as assets or commercial banks establish banking relationships
with exchanges.78 Some recent VC ventures also seem to be moving towards
a higher degree of centralization.79 It is perhaps ironic that business models
in the VC space tend to be gravitating towards a centralized and regulated
model, when VCs such as Bitcoin were conceived counter to centralization
and (public) regulation.
G.

EARLY REGULATORY RESPONSES

In this section, we give a brief overview of the kind of regulatory responses
to VCs that can be observed to date. The first step in determining how VC
schemes should be regulated is to answer the question how VC tokens
themselves should be characterized under existing law. In the first instance,
this has taken place mostly in the form of administrative decisions, and
mostly in the context of securities law, with a particular focus on ICOs
because these are massive fundraising events in which many retail and
institutional investors take part.so In addition, there have been a number of
judicial decisions applying existing legal categories. Increasingly, we expect
to see more legislative initiatives directed at different aspects of VC schemes.
First, it is convenient to note that there is a concentration of VC schemes
in key jurisdictions. 81 In a recent study, W.A. Kaal found that most ICOs
75. See Hileman & Rauchs, supra note 72, at 81.
76. See id. at 32.
77. See id. at 25.
78. See id. at 80.
79. For example, the largest ICO fundraising round so far is by 'EOS,' which promises to be a
platform provider (like Ethereum) on which developers can launch other applications (including
VCs) with more efficient transaction processing. This efficiency is won by a greater
concentration of power within specially authorised nodes. See Brady Dale, EOS is Coming, If
Anyone Can FigureOut How to Vote, COINDESK (May 30, 2018), https://www.coindesk.com/eoscoming-anyone -can -figure-vote/.
80. See Barnett, supra note 66.
81. See Wulf A. Kaal, Initial Coin Offerings: The Top 25 ]urisdictions and Their Comparative
Regulatory Responses, STANFORD J. OF BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL'Y, (Feb. 2, 2018), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3117224.
The summary of regulatory
developments that follows draws on sources that were current at the time of writing in May
2018, as an input for the European Parliament Monetary Dialogue with ECB President Mario
Draghi in July 2019, and it has been published in its original form. For an up to date review, see
in particular Michel Rauchs et al, Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance 2nd Global
Cryptoasset Benchmarking Study (December 2018), https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/faculty-
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had occurred in twenty-five jurisdictions.82 The lion's share (both by
number and value) had taken place in the top five jurisdictions (United
States, United Kingdom, Russian Federation, Switzerland, and Singapore).83
More than half of the twenty-five were in Europe (United Kingdom,
Switzerland, Lithuania, Gibraltar, Germany, Ukraine, France, Spain,
Poland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Serbia, Slovakia, and Sweden).84 Eight
allowed ICOs with no regulation, twelve allowed ICOs with light regulation,
four allowed ICOs with heavy regulation, and one (China) banned ICOs
outright.85 Regulations affecting ICOs ranged from instruments controlling
the ICO process itself, to those regulating VCs generally, DLT generally,
VC exchanges, setting out a compliance program for ICOs, to those
regulating securities generally.86 Securities laws are the most common
source of norms applied to VC token issues in ICOs. 87 While many
regulators have warned investors not to purchase VCs, few have attempted
to prohibit them from doing so.88
1. Administrative Decisions
As explained earlier, most regulators have taken a watch and wait strategy,
and most first steps have consisted in the analogue application of existing
regulations.89
As already noticed, the SEC has been pro-active in applying securities
regulations to emissions of and dealings with VC tokens and has determined
that a number of prominent VC tokens are 'securities' under the Securities
Exchange Act 1934.90 More recently, the SEC has announced its position
that the tokens in the two largest VC schemes, bitcoins and ether, are not
securities. 91 This position is shared by the Commodities and Futures
Trading Commission,92 and now by at least one District Court. 93 Other US
research/centres/alternative -finance/publications/2nd-global-cryptoasset -benchmark-study/#.X
FGaz817mUk and Michel Rauchts et al, CCAF Global Cryptoasset Regulatory Landscape
Study (forthcoming February 2019), which together give a granular view of developments
current at the time of publication.
82. See Kaal, supra note 81.
83. This section draws on a recent study that reviewed the legal treatment of VCs in the top
25 jurisdictions in which VCs have been issued in ICOs: See id.
84. See id.
85. See id. (Figure 6).
86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See Kaal, supra note 81.
89. See id.
90. See Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21 (a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207, July 25, 2017, at 1.
91. See Bob Pisani, Bitcoin and Ether Are Not Securities, CNBC (June 14, 2018), https://www
.cnbc.com/2018/06/14/bitcoin-and-ethereum-are -not-securities -but-some -cryptocurrenciesmay-be -sec-official -says.html.
92. The US Commodity Futures Trading Commission declared "virtual currencies to be a
"commodity" subject to oversight under its authority". See CFTC Backgrounder on Oversight of
and Approach to Virtual Currency Futures Markets, US COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING
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regulators, such as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, have been
proactive in applying AML measures under the Bank Secrecy Act 1970 to
'administrators' and 'exchangers' of VC tokens (but not to users).94
Although it is clear that no VC satisfies the strict definition of a 'currency'
because it is not legal tender in any jurisdiction, the latter implicitly treats
VC tokens as having some 'monetary' property. 95 Most recently, a county
tax collector in Florida has announced that he will accept taxes in Bitcoin.96
Actually this is not entirely accurate, as the payments will be converted into
USD using an exchange, so the announcement does not mean very much
9
beyond the implication of Bitcoin in a mainstream payments system. 7
Turning to the Eurozone, German Bundesanstaltfi'rFinanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) has not reached a final position on the status of VCs.98 The
BaFin has issued a binding decision on the classification of VC tokens in
2016, treating them as a 'unit of account' under § 1(1) of the Kreditzwesengesetz, analogous to foreign currencies and private media of exchange.99
More recently, BaFin has advised that ICOs of VCs are subject to securities
law according to the rights attached to the tokens, which must be assessed on
a case by case basis. 100 The French Autorit des Marches Financiers(AMF) has
taken the position that VCs are not readily categorized in French law, and
has accordingly implemented a program to explore the scope of future
regulation through (i) promoting best practices within the existing legislative
framework, (ii) extending the scope of legislation to classify VCs as
securities, and (iii) propose ad hoc legislation.10 The AMF has also opined
that VC-based derivatives require authorization. As Dell'Erba observes,
COMMISSION (Jan. 4,

2018), https://www.cftc.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/idc/groups/public/@custom
erprotection/documents/file/backgrounder virtualcurrency0l.pdf. In December 2017 the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the Chicago Board Optios Exchange (CME) launched
Bitcoin future contracts. See, e.g., Evelyn Cheng, Bitcoin Debuts On The World's Largest Futures

Exchange, And Prices Fall Slightly, CNBC (Dec. 17, 2017), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/17/
worlds -largest-futures-exchange -set-to-launch-bitcoin-futures-sunday-night.html.
93. See Brendan Pierson, Virtual CurrenciesAre Commodities, USjudge Rules, REtTERS (Mar. 6,
2018), https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-usa-cftc-bitcoin/virtual-currencies-are-commodities-us-judge-rules-idUKKCN 1G32C.
94. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem., supra note 38, at 1.
95. See id.
96. See Joel Greenberg, Joel Greenberg Accepts Bitcoin and Bitcoin Cash for Payments through
BitPay, SEMINOLE CTY. (May 14, 2018), http://www.seminoletax.org/forms/bitcoin-announce

ment.pdf.
97. See id.
98. See Virtual Currency, BAFIN (Mar. 28, 2016), https://www.bafin.de/EN/Aufsicht/FinTech/
VirtualCurrency/virtual-currency node-en.html.
99. See id.
100. Bafin, Supervisory Classification Of Tokens Or Cryptocurrencies Underlying 'Initial Coin
Offerings' (ICOs) As Financial Instruments In The Field Of Securities Supervision (Advisory Letter
Ref. No. WA l l-QB 4100-2017/0010), https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/
Merkblatt/WA/dl hinweisschreiben einordnungICOs-en.pdf;jsessionid=47741 C233 E9A50E
D71B9B 1596A01FOB5.2_cid290? blob=publicationFile&v=2.
101. See Marco Dell'Erba, Initial Coin Offerings. A Primer. The First Response of Regulatory
Authorities, 14 N.Y.U. J. OF L. & Bus. 1109 (2017).
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France is one of the only countries to date that has followed conventional
consultation practices with regards to VCs.102 The Spanish Comision
Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV) takes the view that for the time

being (until further EU harmonization in this area is achieved), a case-bycase 'substance over form' approach is needed.103 The CNMV considers
that a significant number of the operations structured as ICOs should be
treated as offerings of transferable securities, because they give rise to rights
similar to those of traditional securities and, thus, should be subject to the
legal framework applicable to securities in the EU, including MIFID II, the
Prospectus Directive and the Alternative Investment Funds Directive.104
The Bank of Lithuania has taken the position that securities and ANIL laws
apply to VC schemes and has discouraged investors from purchasing VC
tokens.105 Financial institutions in Lithuania are required to insulate their
VC-related activities from their other activities.106

ESMA has recently adopted new product intervention measures on the
provision of contracts for difference (CFDs) and binary options, including
07
inter alia leverage limits on cryptocurrencies.
The UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has taken the position that
VCs may be regulated as securities according to the rights acquired with the
VC token, as determined on a case-by-case analysis.o- The FCA has
acknowledged a lack of jurisdiction where a VC scheme is launched overseas,
and that certain financial uses of DLT could circumvent existing
regulations.109

The Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority issued four prospectuses
with regard to certificates linked to crypto-currencies in 2015, 2016, 2017
and in May 2018 (all XBT Provider AB).ii0 The latest prospect concerns not
102. See id. at 22
103. See Joint Press Release, CNMV & Banco de Espafia, Joint Press Statement By CNMV &
Banco De Espan-a On "Cryptocurrencies" And "Initial Coin Offerings" (ICOs), (Feb. 8, 2018),
http://www.cnmv.es/Portal/verDoc.axd?t{6f3 10cc7-6b39-4405-a8f7-70d2ble682dl I
(distinguishing between 'security tokens' and 'utility tokens'); see also Press Release, CNMV,
CNMV Considerations On Cryptocurrencies And ICOs Addressed To Market Professionals
(Feb. 8, 2018), http://www.cnmv.es/Portal/verDoc.axd?t{62395018-40eb-49bb-a7lc-4afb5c966
374}. We are grateful to CNMV President Sebastian Albella and CNMV Director Raquel
Garcia Alcubilla for helpful comments as regards the work of the CNMV in this area.
104. See id.
105. See Kaal, supra note 81.
106. See id.
107. See Press Release, European Securities and Markets Authority, ESMA Adopts Final
Product Intervention Measures On CFDs And Binary Options (June 1, 2018), https://www
.esma.europa.eu/press-news/esma-news/esma- adopts-final product-intervention-measurescfds -and-binary-options.
108. See Discussion Paper On Distributed Ledger Technology, UK FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. at 25
(April, 2017), https://www.fca.org.uklnews/press-releases/fca-publishes-feedback-statementdistributed-ledger-technology.
109. See id. at 23.
110. See Base Prospectus, XBT PROVIDER AB (May 17, 2018), https://fintelegram.com/wpcontent/uploads/2018/08/XBT-Provider-AB -Base -Prospectus.pdf.
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only bitcoin and Ethereum, but also LiteCoin, Bitcoin Cash, Ethereum
Classic, Ripple, Neo and "a basket of combination of these"."' None of
these new certificates have yet been traded with.112 The latest approved
113
prospect has been passported to the UK.
The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) has
promulgated guidelines according to which VC tokens will be treated as
114
securities where it satisfies the relevant definitions in Swiss law.
According to paragraph 3.3 of the ICO Guidelines published by the Swiss
Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA):
The issuing of tokens that are analogous to equities or bonds can also
result in prospectus requirements under the Swiss Code of Obligations.
FINMA has no direct responsibility in this area but expects ICO
organisers to themselves clarify these requirements. According to the
draft Financial Services Act (FinSA) prospectus requirements will
become part of supervisory law (Art. 37 Draft FinSA). The Swiss Code
of Obligations and FinSA provide for a number of different exceptions
and exemptions."5
Further afield, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation initially took a
critical view of VCs, but has since determined that regulation would be
premature and has taken a very permissive approach to ICOs, VCs, and
DLT.116 In early 2018 the Ministry of Finance introduced a Digital Assets
Regulation Bill that defined various aspects of the VC economy."7 The
Monetary Authority of Singapore issued guidance in 2017 stating the
approach of treating VC tokens as securities if they are linked to an
ownership or security interest.s The Australian Securities and Investment
Commission is currently determining whether the Corporations Act 2001
(Commonwealth) (which governs corporations law and many aspect of
capital markets law) applies to VCs, for example as 'managed investment
schemes."' 9 The Commission has instituted an 'Innovation Hub' to keep
track of the market and help innovators navigating the regulatory
landscape.120
111. See id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See Guidelines For Enquiries Regarding The Regulatory Framework For Initial Coin Offerings
(ICOs), FINMA at 6 (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.finma.ch/en/-/media/finma/dokumente/
dokumentencenter/myfinma/1 bewilligung/fintech/wegleitung-ico.pdf la=en&hash=9CBB3 59
72F3ABCB 146FBF7F09C8E88E453 CE600C.
115. See id.
116. See Kaal, supra note 81.
117. See id.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
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2. Judicial Decisions
Like these administrative decisions, the thrust of many early judicial
decisions has been to bring VC schemes under existing securities law.121 But
we can observe a tendency to accept the claim that VC tokens are a means of
payment in some early decisions. In our view, courts in the near future are
likely to (or ought to) take a more nuanced approach to the treatment of VC
tokens and schemes.
In SEC v Trendon T. Shavers and Bitcoin Savings and Trust,122 for example,
the US District Court (E.D. Texas) had to decide whether payments of
bitcoins could constitute an 'investment of money' to determine whether
bitcoin-denominated investments were 'securities' under US law.123 The
court found that it was 'clear that Bitcoin can be used as money' as it could
be used to purchase goods or services, notwithstanding that it was not legal
tender.24 The court stressed the fact that bitcoins were exchangeable for
'conventional currencies' such as USD and euro: 'Therefore, Bitcoin is a
currency or form of money, and investors wishing to invest in BTSCT
provided an investment of money.'125 This decision should not necessarily
be read as an endorsement of Bitcoin's bid for money status, as the main
thrust of the decision was to treat investments in the fund as 'securities'.26
More recently, a District Court judge ruled that VC 'can be regulated by
CFI'C as a 'commodity,' as '[v]irtual currencies are "goods" exchanged in a
market for a uniform quality and value.'1 27 In our view, it will be some time
before we have a consistent line of authorities emerging in any jurisdiction,
especially as cases are brought before the courts with different specific
questions in mind-i.e. relating to theft, fraud, tax, investor protection,
counterfeiting, for example.
In its 2015 decision in Skatteverket v David Hedqvist, Case C-264/14, the
Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that certain exchange
transactions between fiat currency and Bitcoin were prima facie liable to
VAT, but exempt under Art. 135(e) of the VAT Directive 2006/112/CE as
'transactions . . . concerning currency, bank notes and coins used as legal
tender.'128 The Court held that the VAT was intended to 'alleviate the
difficulties connected with determining the taxable amount and the amount
of VAT deductible which arise in the context of financial transactions.'129
121. See CFTC v. McDonnell, 287 F.Supp.3d 213 (2018); see also SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV416, 2013 WVL 4028182 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013).
122. See Shavers, 2013 VL 4028182 at *2.
123. See id. (using the first limb of the test from SEC v. W.J. Howey & Co., 328 U.S. 293, 29899 (1946)).
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See McDonnell, 287 F.Supp.3d at 228.
128. See Skatteverket v. Hedqvist, C-264/14, July 16, 2015, at T 6, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/
celex.jsf?celex=62014CJ0264&langl=en&type=TXT&ancre=.
129. See id. at T 36.
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These difficulties, it said, could also arise in transactions involving VCs; to
deny the exemption would 'deprive it of part of its effect.'130 What is
noteworthy about this judgment is that the Court refused to exempt the
transactions under Art. 135(d), which covers transactions 'concerning
deposit and current accounts, payments, transfers, debts, cheques and other
negotiable instruments. ' 13 The VC, it said, was 'a contractual means of
payment' and could not be regarded as a 'current account or a deposit
account, a payment or a transfer.'132 It further differentiated the VC tokens
from 'debts, cheques and other negotiable instruments' and instead
characterized it as a 'direct means of payment between the operators that
accept it.1 33 It thus treated bitcoins as 'analogous to other convertible
currencies as regards their use in the real world. ' 134 It would have been
possible for the Court to achieve the same result under the exemption in Art.
135(f), which covers transactions 'in shares, interests in companies or
associations, debentures and other securities'. 35 This was perhaps based on
an error in the Court's apprehension of how bitcoins are actually used;
bitcoins are not generally used as a medium of exchange at all but as a
speculative store of value, and, with respect, should have been treated as
such.
As already mentioned, one Japanese court has ruled36 that bitcoins are
incapable of ownership because they do not satisfy the legal definition of a
'thing,' as Japanese law defines things as (i) tangible, spatio-temporal entities
that can (ii) be made subject to one's exclusive control. This left the
company's creditors with damages claims rather than claims based in
ownership.13r (This is implicitly at odds with the regulatory position taken
by the SEC that bitcoins are akin to 'commodities'). The question is
important because about 200,000 bitcoins are still in the possession of the
company; as the USD price of bitcoins has increased significantly since the
exchange filed for insolvency, at current valuations all the company's debts
could be paid with a large surplus to return to shareholders138
130. See id. at T 51.
131. See id. at T 6.
132. See id. at T 42.
133. See id. at
38, 42.
134. See id. at T 12.
135. See id. at T 6.
136. See Kyodo News, Bitcoins Lost In Mt. Gox Debacle 'Not Subject To Ownership' Claims: Tokyo
(Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/06/national/
crime -legal/bitcoins-lost-in-mt-gox-debacle-not- subject- to ownership-claims-tokyo-courtrules/#.W9YI12YXE5.
137. See id.
138. See Justin Sabin & Bryce Suzuki, The Magic of Mt. Gox: How Bitcoin Is Confounding
Insolvency Law, BCLP GRID: GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING AND INSOLVENCY DEVS. (Nov. 28,
2017), https://bclpgrid.com/the-magic-of-mt-gox-how-bitcoin-is -confounding-insolvency-law/
Court, JAPAN TIMES
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Legislative Acts

Certain US states have passed or are in the process of passing laws that
regulate one or the other aspect of DLT in ways that may be of relevance to
VCs. Delaware corporate law now specifically recognizes blockchain
maintenance of corporate records provided that those records are converted
into clearly legible paper form within a reasonable time and that securities
registers kept in this manner are used to prepare the list of shareholders or
record share transfers. 139 The law removes the mention of 'officers' in
charge of the securities register or records 'maintained' by the corporation
and instead provides for records "administered by or on behalf of the
corporation" to ensure that DLT can be used for these purposes. 140 Reforms
in Arizona and Nevada ensure that market participants can use DLT for
purposes of corporate record-keeping and contracting, for example by
stipulating expressly that blockchain-based transactions count as 'digital
141
signatures' for legal purposes.
The Gibraltar Financial Services (Distributed Ledger Technology
Providers) Regulations 2017142 address DLT, VCs, and VC exchanges. This
is a facilitative, principles-based instrument that seeks to encourage financial
innovation using DLT while ensuring standards by closing up the perceived
regulatory gap.
One of the most impressive legislative projects to date is a bundle of
legislation in Malta. 143 The Maltese Financial Services Authority has
prepared a Virtual Financial Assets Bill (VFA Bill), which is currently being
debated in Parliament. 144 The aim of the Bill is to create a regulatory
framework applicable to ICOs as well as entities offering services, such
exchanges, in relation to digital assets falling outside scope of the existing
financial regulation, when such activity is carried out in or from within
Malta. 14 The objective underlying the VFA Bill is to create a framework
that supports the innovation and new technologies for financial services in
139. See Catherine Simard, Delaware Provides Legal Clarification For Blockchain Maintenance Of

Corporate Records

The View From Canada, NORTON

ROSE FULBRIGHT

(Sept. 2018), http://

www.nortonrosefulbright.com/knowledge/publications/155384/delaware-provides -legal-clarifi
cation-for-blockchain-maintenance-of-corporate-records-the-view-from-canada.
140. See id.
141. See ARiz.

REV. STAT.

ANN.

§ 44-7061(A) (2017).

142. See Financial Services (DistributedLedger Technology Providers) Regulations 2017, No. 4401
GILBRALTAR GAZETTE (Oct.

12, 2017), https://www.triay.com/wp-contentluploads/2017/10/

Financial- Services-Distributed-Ledger-Technology-Providers-Regulations-2017.pdf.
143. We are grateful to Christopher P. Buttigieg of the Malta Financial Services Authority and
to Pauline Lanzon of the Central Bank of Malta for furnishing us with helpful information
about the Maltese legislative program in this regard.

144. See Parliament of Malta, C 778, An Act To Regulate The Field Of Initial Virtual Financial
Asset Offerings And Virtual Financial Assets And To Make Provision For Matters Ancillary Or
Incidental Thereto Or Connected Therewith, May 22, 2018, http://justiceservices.gov.mt/

DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lp&itemid=29079&1=1.
145. See id.
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the area of VCs, whilst ensuring effective investor protection, financial
market integrity and financial stability.146
The objectives of financial regulation are achieved through minimum
transparency requirements applicable to ICOs and governance, conduct and
prudential requirements applicable to persons involved in VC activity. This
regulation is based on the high-level principles enshrined in existing EU
financial services legislation in relation to the provision of investment
services, financial markets and prevention of market abuse. Furthermore,
the VFA Bill and underlying framework aims at implementing the fifth antimoney laundering directive with regard to virtual currencies. 147 The VFA
Bill was published in the Government Gazette of Malta48 together with two
corresponding bills, the Malta Digital Innovation Authority Bill (MDIA Bill)
and the Innovative Technology Arrangements and Services Bill (ITAS
Bill).149 The objective of the MDIA Bill is to provide for the establishment
of an authority to be known as the Malta Digital Innovation Authority, to
support the development of technology innovation, and exercise regulatory
functions regarding technology arrangements including distributed or
decentralized ledger technology. The aim of the ITAS Bill is to provide for
the regulation of designated innovative technology arrangements, as well as
of designated innovative technology services. Overall the aim of the three
Bills is that of ensuring a higher degree of consumer protection in this field.
III.

Privately Issued Virtual Currencies

In this section, we discuss some of the issues raised by privately issued
VCs in the context of the Eurosystem in more detail. Again, not everything
called a 'VC' is accurately called a 'currency' at all. VCs generally fall into
four main use cases: (i) use as speculative digital assets, (ii) use as media of
exchange, (iii) use as payment rails (e.g. for fiat to fiat payments), and (iv)
non-financial uses (e.g. 'notarial' recordkeeping of intellectual property
ownership or personal identity).50 In the context of the three financial use
cases, we discuss (i) the direct challenge to central bank control over the
money supply posed by VCs intended to operate as 'currencies'; (ii) the
potential for VCs negatively to impact the financial system, and (iii) the
potential impact of VCs on central bank monetary policy.
Some uses obviously correspond to legal categories-a VC token used as a
speculative asset obviously resembles a 'security,' and a VC used as a
medium of exchange obviously resembles a 'currency,' for example. But the
task of characterization is complicated because (i) the relevant legal
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See Government Notices Published in Govt. Gazette No. 19,994 of 22nd May 2018, 614 Gov.
https://gov.mt/en/Government/Government o20Gazette/Government%

MT. (May 22, 2018),

20Notices/Pages/2018/05/gov-notices-2205.aspx.
149. See id.
150. See Hileman & Rauchs, supra note 72, at 105.
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categories are indeterminate, especially in the context of supranational law,
(ii) many VC tokens show hybrid features, and (iii) VC tokens may be used
differently than intended by their issuer. In this section, we aim to provide a
clearer basis for approaching legal categorization. Not only is this important
to guide national and European regulators as they apply existing regulations
to VCs and their issuing or controlling entities; it is also necessary to identify
blind spots in national and European regulations themselves.
A.

A DIRECT CHALLENGE

A number of private VCs position themselves as direct competitors to the
traditional monetary system. Bitcoin, for example, was intended to pose a
direct challenge to the Eurosystem in both its money supply and monetary
policy role by providing an alternative form of currency to central bank
liabilities (circulating as currency) and commercial bank liabilities backed
with fractional reserves of central bank money (circulating as book-money in
non-cash payment systems). The question is: How credible is this
challenge?'15
It is primafacie credible to the extent that digital payment instruments are
increasingly more convenient than physical currency for a wide range of
transactions; in many Member States, the use of cash is observed to be in
decline.152 If VC-based payment systems were used to the exclusion of cash
and book-money, VCs could take whole economies outside the conventional
monetary system, which would in turn erode both commercial banks' role in
the monetary system and central banks' power over the money supply and
monetary policy. 153This would affect the Eurosystem's core regulatory tasks
of maintaining systemic stability, maintaining efficiency and security in
payment systems, and implementing monetary policy.54
In our view it is fairly clear that VCs are not currently used as a medium of
exchange (or means of payment) in nearly sufficient quantities to pose a
credible direct threat. The startling growth of Bitcoin and other VCs
suggests that there is some demand for VC-based payments. But in our
view, this demand is driven more by an appetite for non-traditional
speculative assets than by a desire for money outside the conventional
monetary system. This appetite is perhaps driven by the immense liquidity
in the capital markets at present, as a result of unconventional monetary
policy tools such as Quantitative Easing (QE). Indeed, despite the startling
growth in the number (and nominal market capitalization) of VCs, it appears
that most VCs are being used not as currency substitutes at all.155
151. See Andrea O'Sullivan, How Do Cryptocurrencies Affect Monetary Policy?, COINCENTER
(June 20, 2018), https://coincenter.org/entry/how-do-cryptocurrencies-affect-monetary-policy.
152. See Hileman & Rauchs, supra note 72, at 88.
153. See Markets Committee, CentralBank Digital Currencies, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS
COMM. ON PAYMENTS AND MARKETS INFRASTRUCTURES

at 7 (Mar. 2018), https://www.bis

.org/cpmi/publ/dl 74.pdf
154. See Hileman & Rauchs, supra note 72, at 90.
155. See id. at 35.
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Bitcoin transaction numbers have fallen in recent months, from about
400,000 per week in late 2017 (when prices peaked at close to US $20,000)
to about half that in March 2018.156 This is very small in comparison to
other payment systems like Visa, which processes some 65,000 transactions
per second. 157 The recent drop in Bitcoin transactions perhaps also suggests
that many of these transactions are in the nature of financial trades rather
than retail or wholesale payments, which is consistent with our view that
most users do not in fact use their bitcoins as a medium of exchange but
rather as a digital asset that they hope will appreciate in value to yield
speculative gains. 158
Although it is not everything,59 a thing's function as a medium of
exchange is probably the most important factor in determining a thing's
money status. This is precisely the function in which Bitcoin, in particular,
performs most poorly, and no conventional VC performs very well at all.160
This is likely to remain the case for at least three reasons:
i. VC payments are generally slow compared to conventional
electronic payment systems. Bitcoin is orders of magnitude slower than
traditional payment systems; other (newer) VCs are significantly faster
than Bitcoin but still much slower than e.g. Visa, e-money payments, or
even commercial bank transfers using modern transfer systems. 161 This
is due to the cost of trustlessness, i.e. the complex processes used to
verify transactions in the absence of a trusted intermediary such as a
bank.
ii. There is a limited supply of bitcoins (and many other VCs), and
generally there is no equivalent to a central bank which can coordinate
the supply of VC tokens to the needs of the economy transacting in
them. This incentivizes holding as a speculative asset over use as a
medium of exchange.
iii. Permissionless blockchains generally use a massive amount of
computing power and energy per transaction. One recent study
estimates that Bitcoin uses as much energy as certain countries (2.55
gigawatts and growing) although it powers a tiny economy.162 In other
156. See Bloomberg, Bitcoin Transaction Volume Is Puzzling Investors, FORTUNE (Mar. 2, 2018),
http://fortune.com/2018/03/02/bitcoin-price-transaction-volume/.
157. See Visa Fact Sheet, VISA (Aug. 2017), https://usa.visa.com/dam/VCOMIglobal/about-visa/
documents/visa-facts-figures-jan-2017.pdf.
158. See Olga Kharif, Bitcoins Use in Commerce Keeps FallingEven as Volatility Eases, BLOOMBERG
(Aug.

1,

2018),

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-0I/bitcoin-s-use-in-

commerce -keeps -falling-even-as-volatility-eases.
159. See generally Geoffrey Ingham, The Nature of Money, 5 EcON. SOCIOLOGY: EUROPEAN
ELECTRONIC NEWSLETTER 17, 19 (2004), https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/155831/
l/volO5-no02-a2.pdf.
160. Ripple, which provides an RTGS system, has issued VC tokens but operates quite
differently and does not claim to displace currency in retail payments in the monetary system.

161. See Visa Fact Sheet supra note 157.
162. See Alex de Vries, Bitcoin's Growing Energy Problem, 2 JOULE 801 (2018), https://www.cell
.com/joule/fulltext/S2542 -4351(18)30177 -6.
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words, Bitcoin's qualification as a currency would entail a global
environmental disaster under current conditions.
The importance of these technical limitations is revealed by current
market developments. One response is to add 'layers' to the Bitcoin
technology stack. For example, wallets and exchanges that process
transactions off-chain increase the efficiency and transaction speed of a
permissionless VC like Bitcoin. But they do this only by adding features of
centralization and intermediation to a (supposedly) decentralized and
disintermediated payment system. In so doing, they depart from the core
ethos of the cryptocurrency movement and exacerbate the need for
regulatory control as they create parallel financial institutions in a shadow
payments system. Ironically, one of the layers to be built on the Bitcoin
stack might even be physical tokens: One company is now issuing 'smart'
banknotes for digital assets. 16 3 Bitcoin notes are already available in
Singapore.164 These 'banknotes' are physical (so-called 'cold-storage')
devices for private keys associated with a number of bitcoins.165 They are
similar to e-money stored locally on a 'smart card' or other device, but the
value the store is not in fiat money but Bitcoin, and, more importantly, they
are designed not for electronic transfer but physical exchange.66 Their
existence speaks powerfully to the inefficiency of the Bitcoin 'electronic
cash' system.
It is important to note that these failures may be avoided by other VCs in
the future. Transaction speed and efficiency is a hotspot of innovation in the
VC developer community, and any given VC's status would have to be
reassessed if it started to act more like money. In other words, despite our
functional-empirical rejection of the direct challenge, the Eurosystem must
take VCs seriously, monitor the VC market closely, and model various
contingencies in order to intervene in a timely and effective manner in case
things do ever change.

Indeed, when addressing the credibility of the direct challenge, it is
important to separate (i) the conceptual reasons why a given VC is not
'money' (or could not replace conventional money) and (ii) the empirical
reasons why a given VC has not acquired money status (or has not acquired
it yet). In our view, there is significant disagreement and indeterminacy in
the concept of 'money' that makes it difficult to reject the direct challenge
on conceptual grounds, even if the answer is (still) fairly clear on empirical
grounds.167 We expand on this theme in Section 2.3, below.
163.

TANGEM,

https://tangem.com (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).

164. See Kevin Helms, Bitcoin Smart Banknotes Launched in Singapore, BITCOI

NEWS (May 4,
2018), https://news.bitcoin.com/bitcoin-smart -banknotes/.
165. See JP Buntinx, Tangem Brings Physical Bitcoin Banknotes to Singapore, NuLLTX (May 7,
2018), https://nulltx.com/tangem-brings -physical-bitcoin-banknotes-to-singapore/.
166. See id.
167. See Ingham, supra note 159.
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Without begging questions, in our view the concept of money must look
at a token's legal status and economic functions, which traditionally include
(i) a commonly accepted medium of exchange, (ii) a unit of account, (iii) a
168
store of value and standard of deferred value and (iv) a means of payment.
Of these, functioning as a medium of exchange and means of payment seem
to us to be the most important for the purposes of our discussion.169 Indeed,
'money' and 'payment systems' are conceptually connected; money seems to
be something that emerges from a payment system, whether that is a
payment system that uses physical tokens (e.g. currency) or other
representations of value (e.g. account based payment systems). Thus, while
we think it is clear on empirical grounds that neither Bitcoin nor any other
VC has (yet) acquired money status, the conceptual back door remains open
to changes in the operation of the VC market.
B.

VCs

AS A VECTOR OF FINANCIAL CONTAGION

Whether considered as money-like or as security-like, a VC may pose a
risk of contagion in the 'real world' financial system by spreading liquidity
problems into the latter. The risk of financial contagion follows on from our
border metaphor; as ECB Vice-President Yves Mersch said in a recent
interview, 'bridges' between the virtual world and the real world can be a
vector for contagion.'70 A collapse in the virtual world can drain liquidity
from real world financial institutions, which could become a concern for
7
central banks as the system's lenders of last resort.' 1
In our view, contagion is most likely to spread through (i) growth of the
VC-based payments system to systemically relevant proportions, or (ii)
exposure to VC assets whose volatility could spread liquidity problems to the
regulated sector.'72 Though the literature on contagion is rather extensive,
and a lot has been published in the context of the 2008 crisis and its
aftermath,'73 not much has been written to date about the risk of contagion
168. See Arthur Nussbaum, Basic Monetary Conceptions in Law, 35 MiCH. L. REV. 865, 866-67
(1937); see also ROSA M. LASTRA, INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AND MONETARY LAW, 12-3,
OXFORD UNIV. PRESS (2d ed. 2015).
169. See Nussbaum, supra note 168, at 868; see also LASTRA, supra note 168, at 12-3.
170. See Yves Mersch, Member of the Exec. Bd. of the ECB, Virtual Or Virtueless? The Evolution
Of Money In The DigitalAge, Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (Feb. 8, 2018).
171. See id.
172. See id.
173. See European Central Bank, Financial Stability Review, at 134, Dec. 2009, https://www
.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/financialstabilityreview2009l2en.pdf;
see Jaen-Claude Trichet,
President of the European Central Bank, Clare Distinguished Lecture in Economics and Public
Policy: Systemic Risk (Dec. 10, 2009); see John B. Taylor, Senior Fellow at the Hoover
Institution, Stanford University, Dinner Keynote Speech at the Conference on Financial

Innovation and Crises, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta: Systemic Risk and the Role of Government
(May 12, 2009); see Anna Gelpern, FinancialCrisis Containment, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1051 (2009);
see Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of FinancialRegulation to Risk
Models and the Global FinancialCrisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127 (2009); Amir E. Khandani, Andrew
W. Lo & Robert C. Merton, Systemic Risk and the Refinancing Ratchet Effect (Harvard Business
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VCs. 174 Any risk can grow to systemic proportions when its negative
impact extends beyond an individual institution, affecting or threatening to
affect other institutions, potentially creating a disruption in the monetary
system and associated problems in the real economy.175 The most important
developments to watch, therefore, are (i) the size of the VC payments system
and (ii) the degree of entanglement between the VC payments system and
existing economies.
of

1.

Contagion from the Shadow Payments System

It can be argued that there are three kinds of payment systems currently in
operation: (i) currency (banknotes representing central bank liabilities, with
legal tender status), (ii) deposit account transfer systems (e.g. check and giro
payment systems by which commercial bank liabilities are transferred from
one ledger to another), and (iii) note transfer systems (e.g. written debt
instruments issued by commercial banks without legal tender status). 176 As
Rogers correctly argues, e-money should probably be regarded as a modern
form of (iii) rather than as something categorically novel.77
If VCs do not (yet) pose a direct threat to the primacy of traditional
money, but if regulators are unwilling (or unable) to ban VCs in the
European payments ecosystem altogether, they will continue to function as
payment systems (albeit not very good ones, or ones that make crime,
financial crime, and tax evasion more difficult to investigate and
prosecute).'78 The default choice, then, is for VCs to form part of a more
complex payments system in which VCs compete with traditional money.
The question then becomes one of the terms on which private VCs should
be allowed to exist and operate.
Awrey and van Zwieten draw attention to the fact that every payments
system has both a liquidity function and a storage function.'79 Failures in
both can cause problems for the wider financial system and for the real
economy. 1 0 Systemic risk is heightened by the possibility that VC-based
payment providers bundle their payments services with other financial
services, in particular, by operating a kind of fractional reserve policy to
create a supply of money-like payment instruments on the basis of a reserve
School, Working Paper 10 023, 2009); See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J.
193 (2008); see Adriano Lucatelli, Finance and World Order: FinancialFragility, Systemic Risk and
TransnationalRegimes 70-3, (Westport Connecticut: Greenwood Press 1997).
174. For a recent analysis on systemic implications, see Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New
Deal: FinTech as a Systemic Phenomenon (Cornell Law School Research Paper No. 18-39, 2018).
175. See Saule T. Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: Fintech as a Systemic Phenomenon, 36 YALE J.
ON REG. (forthcoming 2019).

176. See James Steven Rogers, The New Old Law of Electronic Money, 58 SMU L. REv. 1253,
1254 (2005).

177. Id.
178. See Dan Awrey & Kristin van Zwieten, The Shadow Payment System, 43 J. CORP. L. 775,
779 (2018).

179. Id. at 778.
180. See id. at 805.
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of VC assets that are not even guaranteed by the technical limitations on the
VC itself.181 The conventional tools for regulating payment service
providers-portfolio restrictions, private third-party insurance, the
mandatory outsourcing of storage functions to regulated entities (i.e.
commercial banks), and the use of fiduciary ring-fencing mechanisms-are
all directed towards problems with the storage function.182 These tools do
not, however, address systemic liquidity risks.183
Although unregulated activities performed by unregulated entities are
theoretically insulated from the regulated financial system, the VC economy
is not wholly self-contained. A 2017 study of VCs found that two-thirds of
payments in 2016 were from fiat to VC; fiat to fiat payments via VC
accounted for twenty-seven percent of payments, and VC to VC payments
only accounted for six percent. 84 The apparent diversity in the VC market
is also partly illusory.85 Bitcoin plays a foundational role, as does Ether.86
Many VCs are only purchasable in Bitcoin or Ether, and VCs running on
the Ethereum platform require Ether to run.187 The price of other VCs is,
accordingly, not insensitive to price of these two VCs.I88 Thus, while the
VC economy has grown at a startling pace and shows signs of further
growth,89 it is difficult to cash out (especially if there were a crisis, e.g.
precipitated by unfavorable regulation or discovery of security problems).
Awrey and van Zwieten therefore suggest a separation of storage and
liquidity functions.90 The VC "shadow payment[s] system represents a new
frontier in institutional design and regulation," which may require more
hands-on regulatory intervention.19, Matters cannot be left to private
contractual agreement and/or industry self-regulation, they argue, because
of some structural features of the VC market, in particular because many
early VC payments services providers: (i) are unknown, or lack well
developed corporate personality, capacity, and governance systems, and (ii)
are techno-libertarian in outlook, and possibly run by actors convinced that
they are operating in a space that is (and should remain) free of national (or
181. See id.
182. Id. at 808.
183. Id.
184. GARRICK HILEMAN & MICHEL RATCHS, GLOBAL CRYPTOCURRENCY BENCHMARKING
STUDY 10 (2017).
185. See id. at 34.
186. Id.
187. So-called "gas" is a measurement of the computational processing power needed to
perform an action on the Ethereum platform, but there is no token for "gas," so units of gas are
paid in units of Ether. See, e.g., Jeff Coleman, Comment to Ethereum Stack Exchange, STACK
EXCHANGE, (Jan. 20, 2016, 5:51 PM), https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/questions/3 /whatis -meant-by-the-term-gas.
188. See HILEMAN & RAtCHS, supra note 184, at 18.
189. See id. at 5.
190. Awrey & van Zwieten, supra note 178, at 808.
191. Id.
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supra-national) regulation.192 This may change as more conventional players

enter the space, but
such as the Second
gives wide latitude
minimizes systemic
industry.
2.

in the meantime even up-to-date payments regulations,
Payments Services Directive (EU) 2015/2366,193 which
to the industry to design institutional features and
risks, may not be appropriate to the VC payments

Contagion from Risky DigitalAssets

The risk of contagion also rests on the possibility that regulated entities
have assumed positions that expose them to VC price fluctuations either by:
(i) purchasing assets themselves, (ii) lending to investors who have purchased
VC assets, or (iii) structuring regulated products such as derivatives on the
basis of an underlying VC asset. 194 The basis of the risk of contagion is the
well-known and extraordinary volatility of the price of VC tokens. 195 For
example, the first quarter of 2 018 saw VC tokens lose value almost across the
board; Bitcoin, in particular, fell from record heights in late 2017 from
almost $20,000 US dollars to their value at the time of writing of around
$7,000 US dollars.196
The conventional approach is to regulate systemically important entities,
provide publicly supported protections for activities within the regulated
space, and allow unregulated entities to fail. 197 But the border is porous, and
so this strategy is not always straightforward.
At present, mainstream financial institutions in Europe have been rightly
cautious about exposing themselves to the VC market.198 But the boundary
between the protected and unprotected parts of a payment system, and the
existence of greater regulatory constraints on the protected part, incentivizes
a cycle of flows into the unregulated part of the system during expansions. 199
In order to pursue business opportunities, those in the regulated sector will
seek to open up connected operations in the non-regulated sector to catch
opportunities there. Conversely, in times of crisis, we expect flows out of
the unregulated sector, which could cause significant liquidity problems for
entities operating in that space. To date, VC-based payment companies have
192. Id. at 808-09.

193. Directive 2015/2366 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November
2015 on Payment Services in the Internal Market, amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2009/110/
EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, and Repealing Directive 2007/64/
EC, 2015 OJ. (L 337) 35.
194. See Yves Mersch, Virtual or Virtueless? The Evolution of Money in the DigitalAge, EUROPEAN
CENTRAL BANK (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2018/html/ecb.spl 8
0208.en.html.
195. Id.
196. Matthew J. Belvedere, Bitcoin Bull Tom Lee Wants Wall Street to Know He Didn't Cut His
Year-EndForecast,CNBC (last updated Jul. 6, 2018, 8:31 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/
05/fundstrats-tom-lee-cuts-his-year-end-bitcoin-forecast-to-20000.html.
197. See Awrey & van Zwieten, supra note 178, at 795-96.
198. See Mersch, supra note 194.

199. See id.
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experienced difficulty in establishing and maintaining relationships with
conventional banks and payment networks.200 Given the record profits that
have been made in VC speculation, however, this position is susceptible to
change. Recently, Barclays UK established a banking relationship with a
major US-based VC exchange, Coinbase.201 This will make it easier for UKbased individuals and firms to purchase VCs with GBP directly.202 One
analyst has been quoted to the effect that there is "a wall of institutional
money just waiting for the right conditions . . . to enter the market."203
VC-based derivatives, in particular, seem to be a beachhead for forays by
regulated entities into the VC space. Structuring products such as
derivatives could cause a regulated entity to become exposed based on
underlying asset; investors and their lenders could also be exposed if they
leverage their acquisition of VC assets.
The EBA has recommended that national authorities "discourage credit
institutions, payment institutions and e-money institutions from buying,
holding, or selling VCs. "204 The EBA's seminal 2014 Opinion sketched out
a full suite of regulations for VCs (based on the VC market at the time).205
The Opinion evaluated such a full suite as too expensive proportionate to
the risk then posed by VCs, and suggested an approach of containment and
active monitoring by default.206 As the VC payments sector grows, it will
demand regulation-especially as (i) more retail customers are exposed to
VC assets, (ii) more conventional financial institutions are exposed to VC
assets, and (iii) the number of de facto intermediaries (such as wallet and
exchange providers) grows.
In our view, it is essential that regulators within the Eurosystem take
proactive steps to ensure that the VC-based shadow payment system is not
allowed to grow to a size, or to a degree of entanglement with conventional
payment networks, such that it could pose a credible risk of contagion. One
question in this regard is whether the Eurosystem should focus on
protecting the system from VCs, or whether it also has to play a role in
protecting users' interests within the VC economy. 207 The more retail
investors become exposed in the VC market, and the more this exposure
200. See Tommy Wilkes & Emma Rumney, Bitcoin Exchange Reaches Deal With Barclaysfor UK
Transactions, REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2018, 11:58 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cryptocurrencies -barclays/bitcoin-exchange-reaches- deal-with-barclays-for-uk-transactions-idUSKC
N1GQ2JD.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Philip Stafford & Hannah Murphy, London Remains Wary offumping on Crypto Bandwagon,
FIN. TEES (May 25, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/391dl5ae-Sf47-11e8-9334-2218e714

6b04.
204. EUROPEAN BANKING AUTHORITY, EBA OPINION
205. See id. at 39-44.
206. See id. at 5.
207. See PHILIPP HACKER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

ON 'VIRTUAL CURRENCIES'

5-6 (2014).

FOR COMPLEX CRYPTOCURRENCIES?

FRAMEWORK FOR STABILITY AND DECISION MAKING IN BLOCKCHAIN-BASED

5 (2017).
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could affect their real-world position (e.g. their ability to repay a mortgage
208
or save for retirement), the more important it would seem.
C.

CONCEPTUAL CHALLENGES RAISED BY VCs

Perhaps the main challenge in regulating any new technologicallymediated financial practice is to bring it within the legal system's existing
categories. Once an adequate picture of a VC's technical and economic
features has formed, it is necessary to classify the VC token as a legal
object.209 Once it has been classified as a legal object, it must be determined
which type of legal object it is.210 Often, the only approach (in advance of
legislative initiative) is to do one's best to include the new artefacts and
practices within the current definitions through analogical application.211
Generally, this standard mode of legal development is adequate. The
approach can, however, be exhausted before a satisfactory regulatory
framework has been achieved,212 and we perceive this risk to be particularly
high in the context of VCs.
1.

The Problem of Res Digitales

As mentioned earlier, before VC tokens can be characterized as anything
else, they need to be characterized as objects of property rights.213 Recent
commentators in French law, for example, have labelled bitcoins as 'objets
juridiques non identif&'.214 This is an accurate interim assessment, but is not
a stable long-term position for any legal system. If VC tokens could not be
legally the object of property rights at all, there would be an unacceptable
divergence between the legal system and economic expectations.215
Every legal system somehow accommodates VC tokens, but the method
of accommodation differs from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, and this opens up
room for regulatory divergence.216 For example, legal systems based on a
certain reading of the Gaiain Institutes define 'things' capable of ownership
as tangible objects only.217 This has traditionally raised problems such as the
208.
209.
210.
211.
207,
212.
213.

See id. at 18.
See J.G. Allen, Property in Digital Coins, EUR. PROP. L. J. (forthcoming 2019).
See id.
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHi.
207 (1996).
See id. at 208.
See Allen, supra note 209, at 6.

214. Myriam Roussille, Le Bitcoin: Objet ]uridique Non Identifie, 159

BANQUE

&

LEGAL

DROrT

F.

27

(2015).
215. See Shawn Bayern, 'Dynamic Common Law and Technological Change: The Classification of
Bitcoin' (2014)Bitcoin, 71 WASH. & LEE. REV. ONLINE 22, 34 (2014).
216. See Is Bitcoin Legal?, NEWS BTC (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.newsbtc.com/is-bitcoinlegal/.
217. See George L. Gretton, Ownership and its Objects, 71 THE RABEL J. COMP. AND INT'L
PRv. L. 802, 821 (2007) (Ger). Legal systems that follow this Pandectist reading include
Germany, Japan, and Poland.
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characterization of company shares or electricity for the purposes of
property law. There are solutions to these problems, but the systemic cost
of those solutions is often ignored. In any case, VC tokens present a
potentially hard case. Japanese law, for example, has been applied to deny
that bitcoins are capable of being owned in Japanese law, which has had
implications for a multi-billion-dollar insolvency proceeding over a major
VC exchange.218 Similar issues could potentially arise in Europe, which
could make the European insolvency landscape more complex and create
incentives for forum shopping.
Whether they are considered to be money and/or securities, VC tokens
are a class of digital, immaterial objects whose existence and growing
economic importance brings some conceptual problems in the structure of
European legal systems into relief. We might call them res digitales in
contrast to the traditional civilian categories of res corporales and res
incorporales.219 Despite their economic importance, immaterial objects are
not well accounted for in the property law of any European legal system. 220
We have not yet had a European-level discourse on the categorization of
immaterial objects, and in many jurisdictions there is not even a linguistic
framework for describing and categorizing them for internal purposes. 22' In
our view, it should be a priority for NCBs and the ECB to encourage the
rational treatment of VC tokens in European legal systems, as this could
provide a stumbling block to the effective regulation of VCs in Europe.
2.

VCs as Money

The traditional neglect of immaterial objects has contributed to the fact
that modern legal definitions of money have generally focused on banknotes'
and coins' physical properties for the purposes of legal categorization.222
VCs do not, therefore, raise entirely novel problems;223 also problematic is
the conceptual position of book money, i.e. the commercial bank liabilities
that form the bulk of the broad money supply. The economic significance of
book money makes it necessary for monetary law to explain how bilateral
obligations can come to circulate as a medium of payment. The problem is
merely sharpened in the context of VCs schemes like Bitcoin, in which the
tokens are not the obligation of anyone at the time of emission.224
Thus, the next conceptual problem is encountered when asking 'Is a
bitcoin (or any other VC token) a unit of "money" or a security?'
218. See Japan Court Rules Against Bitcoin Compensation Plea, BBC NEWS SERVICES (Aug. 7,
2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-33816664.
219. See PRZEMYSLAW PALKA, VIRTUAL PROPERTY: TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY 154
(2017).
220. See Rogers, supra note 176, at 1253.
221. Christian von Bar, Gemeineuropaisches Sachenrecht Band I (Beck 2015), 311, 314-315.
222. See Rogers, supra note 176, at 1254.
223. See id.
224. See MARCIN SZCZEPANSKL, BITcoIN: MARKET, ECONOMICS AND REGULATION 4
(European Parliamentary Research Serv. 2014).
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Categorization entails important consequences: the 'transfer' of a VC token
on a blockchain from one public key to another public key will have different
tax implications, for example, depending on whether it is treated as a unit of
currency or as a security; likewise, VC schemes are subject to securities
regulations, such as prospectus disclosure, if they are categorized as
securities. 225 Just as importantly, the distribution of oversight competences
within the Eurosystem and within the national regulatory systems of
Member States is determined according to these definitions.226
As we described above, much of the early regulatory response to VCs has
been to bring ICOs under the legal regimes applicable to the issue of
securities. 227 Given our judgment that many VCs currently function as
securities, this is an appropriate response. But securities regulations are not
sufficient on their own; what we have called utility tokens, for example, are
not securities in the traditional sense, and the SEC has recently announced
the view that the two most important VC tokens, bitcoins and ethers, are
more in the nature of digital commodities than securities.228 Further, there
are issues with securities law itself, and we discuss a few complications in the
European securities law context below. In addition, we have seen that
certain authorities, including the CJEU, have deemed certain VCs to be
more akin to currencies, and that some national regulators have given
credence to VCs' payment function, which renders them at least moneylike.229

In general, we recommend that regulators take a functional approach
rather than conducting only formal analyses,230 not least because such a
functional approach allows regulators working in divergent national legal
systems to aim towards a more consistent European approach. Such a
functional approach should, in our view, be followed up with a conceptual
analysis of the basic categories, at least when those categories begin to
diverge from the social and technological context they purport to describe
and which they are designed to regulate.
a.

Differing Conceptions of Money

Whether one wishes to argue that a given VC token is or is not a unit of
money, it is necessary to define the term. But lawyers and economists have
225. See Alina Vardanian, Is Bitcoin a Currency, a Security, or a Commodity?, CINDX (Jul. 4,
2018), https://medium.com/cindx/is-bitcoin-a-currency-a-security-or-a-commodity-its-all ofthese -74b0b962e6d1.
226. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK,
(2016).
227. See WuLF A. KAAL, INITIAL COIN

EUROSYSTEM

OVERSIGHT

POLICY FRAMEWORK

1

THE ToP 25 JURISDICTIONS AND THEIR
(2018).
228. Anna Irrera, U.S. SEC Official Says Ether Not a Security, Price Surges, REUTERS (Jun. 14,
2018, 3:09 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/cryptocurrencies-ether/us-sec-official-saysOFFERINGS:

COMPARATIVE REGULATORY RESPONSES 10

ether-not-a-security-price-surges-idUSL1N1TG1TF.
229. See Hamza Ali, Italy Crypto Traders Still Need Tax Answers, BLOOMBERG (Sep. 4, 2018),
https://www.bna.com/italy-crypto-traders-n73014482247/.
230. See Bayern, supra note 215, at 33-34.
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traditionally approached money from different starting points. Lawyers
conventionally look to whether a medium of exchange is legal tender in the
jurisdiction, i.e. whether subjects are required to accept it as final payment
for debts ('means of payment').231 This definition is accepted to be narrower
than economic definitions of money, but lawyers' concerns are narrower,
and have traditionally centered on the procedural question of what counts as
a final settlement of legal obligations.232
Economists, on the other hand, have generally taken a broader approach,
taking also into account the process of money creation via the banking
system and the recognition of bank deposits as the largest part of money
supply (so-called 'M1').233 The functional approach makes it possible to see
money-ness as more of a spectrum than a binary property, and to accept
various forms of money operating side by side in an economic system (e.g.
cash and book money).234 Empirically, much of what fits the economic
definition of money is created by private commercial banks. The empirical
circle is usually squared with the principle of states' monetary sovereignty by
pointing to the hierarchical relationship between different forms of money
implicit in the practice of fractional reserve banking and central banks'
ultimate control over the money supply and lender of last resort role.235
In our view, an integrated legal and economic definition is desirable. In
the first instance, the strict legal approach must give way to the reality that
payment systems change over time, that currency is less important as a
medium of exchange than it was in the past, and that the bulk of the money
supply exists only as demand deposits on commercial bank ledgers.236 If cash
were to disappear from a country's payment system, that society would not
suddenly become moneyless;23 7 any definition of money committed to this
conclusion is, in our view, unsustainable. As Charles Proctor rightly notes,
"as the available means of payment multiply, the meaning of 'money' must
broaden."238 As such, legal definitions are beginning to move towards a
more functional approach, as well. In parallel to this development, the
function of money as a store of value was increasingly recognized by lawyers
and economists as one of its key foundations in the latter part of the
231. See e.g. F.A.

MANN, THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY

5 (Oxford University Press, 5th ed.,

1992).

232. See id.
233. See Arthur Nussbaum, Basic Monetary Conceptions in Law, 35 MICH. L. REV. 865, 867-68
(1937).
234. See Bayern, supra note 215, at 33-34.
235. See Stephanie Bell, The Role of the State and the Hierarchy of Money, 25 CAMBRIDGE J.
ECON. 149, 159-60 (2001).
236. See Henry Sidgwick, What is Money?, THE FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW, Jan. June 1879, at
563, 566.
237. See Karl Olivecrona, THE PROBLEM OF THE MONETARY UNIT 136-38 (The MacMillan
Company ed., 1957).
238. CHARLES PROCTOR, MANN ON THE LEGAL ASPECT OF MONEY 9 (Oxford University

Press, 6th ed., 2005). See also Simon Gleeson, The Legal Concept of Money (Oxford University
Press, 2018).
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twentieth century, leading to the widespread adoption of laws that gave
primacy to the price stability mandate of independent central banks.239
The contribution from law to economics, on the other hand, is in part to
explain how the thing used as the money-token exists and behaves as an
object of legal commerce (see section 2.3.1, above). This is straightforward
in the case of cash, which has a physical manifestation; it has become
increasingly tricky as money has dematerialized over the past century with
the use of information communications technology in payment systemsfirst the introduction of the telegraph, then computerized recordkeeping,
then the Internet, and now DLT.240
Rather than taking a dogmatic approach to VCs' money status, we think it
is preferable to ask how VCs fit into (and/or change) the existing payment
ecosystem. The three types of payment system (currency, bank accounts,
and bank notes) are used to create both narrow money (i.e. currency and
electronic central bank liabilities), generally created by public central banks,
and broad money (i.e. bank liabilities), the preponderance of which is created
by private commercial banks. The question thus becomes whether any given
VC should be considered part of the broad money supply, or whether it
should be kept insulated from even the economic definition of money
despite its use as a money-like instrument in a payment system.
Finally, it bears noting an obvious but often-neglected fact: the currency
we now use takes the form of bearer securities.241 Fundamentally, therefore,
it seems to us that something can be a security and be money at the same
time; some securities (but not others) circulate as a medium of exchange in a
payment system, just as some tangible commodities (but not others) circulate
as a medium of exchange, and those that so circulate seem to acquire money
status in a commodity money system.
239. Antonio Sainz de Vicuia, for example, advocates an 'institutional theory of money', in
which money is not limited to 'cash', but encompasses a dematerialized concept (called
'scriptural money', which includes demand deposits with credit institutions). This is based on
the small proportion of money physically represented in banknotes and coins, as compared with
the generalized use of the banking system for holding money and for payments. The wide
acceptance and use by society of scriptural money is based on an institutional framework of two
pillars: (i) an independent central bank that ensures the stability of the purchasing capacity of
money and its sound use as means of payment, and (ii) a legislative framework that supports
such independence, the solvency and liquidity of credit institutions, and the reliability of
scriptural money as means of payment See Antonio Sainz de Vicuia, 'An Institutional Theory
of Money' in M. Giovanoli and D. Devos (eds), InternationalMonetary and FinancialLaw: The
Global Crisis (2010) 517. Antonio Sainz de Victfia, 'The Concept of Money in the XXIst
Century,' in a paper presented at the MOCOMILA meeting in Tokyo on 1 April 2004 stated: 'A
currency is trusted by society and markets, when there is an institutional framework that ensures
preservation of purchasing capacity, i.e. price stability. Money is then defined as the
dematerialized "commodity" produced and managed by central banks that serves the function of
store of value.'
240. See DOUGLAS ARNER, JANos BARBERIS & Ross BUCKLEY, THE EVOLUTION OF FINTECH:
A NEW POsT-CRIsIS PARADIGM? (U. New South Wales L. Res. Series, 2016).
241. See Scottish and Northern Ireland Banknotes, BANK OF ENG. (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www
.bankofengland.co.uk/banknotes/scottish-and-northern-ireland-banknotes.
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We have already noted the divergence between legal and economic
approaches to the definition of money. But economic conceptions
themselves of money are not homogeneous. Theories generally fall into two
broad strands. Broadly stated, orthodox or commodity theories of money
stress (i) the historical use of commodities (paradigmatically precious metal)
as the token of the monetary unit and (ii) the bottom up creation of money
systems by economic agents use of a commodity to ease the burdens of
barter exchange.242 Heterodox or credit theories of money, on the other
hand, stress: (i) the importance of legislative fiat giving tokens (whether
metal, paper, or digital) the status of money and (ii) top down creation of
money within constituted politico-legal order, for example by the state's
decree that certain tokens and not others are legal tender for all payment of
all debts, including tax payments to the state. 243 In these theories, the
guarantee that a token can be used to pay one's obligations to the state gives
money a stable value because we all owe obligations to the state. 244
Commodity theories are conceptually sophisticated but tend to proceed
from abstract assumptions about the nature of economic transactions that
are not always empirically robust. They lend themselves well to
mathematical modeling but are criticized by credit theorists as being falsified
by the historical, anthropological, and sociological evidence.245 Credit
theories have the virtue of being generally better supported by extrinsic
evidence and are generally more attractive to lawyers as they stress role of
law and constituted political authority in the creation of money. Indeed, the
commodity theory does not provide the best explanation of the money
system we actually have, in which paper tokens and electronic records of no
intrinsic value are given money status by legislative fiat; our system is
probably better explained by credit theories of money that emphasize the
role of the state.
Current efforts to theorize the place of VCs in the monetary landscape are
confounded by the path-dependency of these established schools of thought.
As Goodhart observes, the theory about optimal currency areas (such as the
Eurozone) is based on orthodox commodity theories, in particular the
notion that optimal currency areas are formed by the needs and efficient
preferences of market participants.246 The Eurosystem, however, rather
shows that currency integration is often a matter of top-down political will
rather than spontaneous market convergence, and strong populist objection
to euro bolsters the notion that it is a top-down rather than bottom-up
242. See Kian Lua, ESSAYS IN MONETARY THEORY AND POLICY: ON THE NATURE OF MONEY
(4) (New Economic Perspectives, posted on Dec. 24, 2013), http://neweconomicperspectives
.org/2013/12/essays-monetary-theory-policy-nature-money- 3-2.html.
243. See id.
244. See id.
245. See id.
246. See Charles A.E. Goodhart, The Two Concepts of Money: Implications for the Analysis of
Optimal CurrencyAreas, 14 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 407, 407 (1998).
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phenomenon.24 7 On the other hand, state-centric credit theories of money
leave us with little to say about the tokens that circulate within a private
payment network such as a VC scheme.
In effect, there is a kind of lost theoretical middle ground, namely private
credit theories of money. Theorists committed to the idea that communities
can create money through their own choice and action have too often tied
themselves to a commodity theory of money that does not explain the use of
tokens with no intrinsic value; theorists committed to the idea that worthless
tokens can be endowed with value by a community and circulate as 'real'
money have too often tied themselves to a state-centric view that excludes
the possibility of private fiat currencies. In consequence, many VC
advocates tend to position VC tokens as 'commodities' with some kind of
intrinsic value in virtue of their algorithmically-determined scarcity.248 But
that generally misses the point that even commodities only become money
when they are given that status (whether through custom or legislative fiat),
in virtue of which they acquire an exchange value separate to their use-value.
As Karl Elster correctly observed a century ago, "money is created in the
'
same instant in which the good ends its conceptual existence."249
In our view, VCs make it necessary to ask why, if payment systems give
rise to money, private payment systems do not give rise to private money (or
at least something money-like)?25 0 The answer to this question will require
some concessions from the perspective of either camp.
c.

Monetary Competition

Despite these fundamental disagreements, it is fair to say that, from an
economic perspective, various forms of money coexist in a hierarchy in our
monetary system as presently constituted, in which a central bank is
generally accepted to sit at the apex. 25' This has been the case since the
political settlement between private money creation and public authority in
the 17th century, leading to the creation of the Bank of England-a model
which has since been exported to many other jurisdictions.22 Commodity
theorists and credit theorists explain this fact in different ways and evaluate it
differently. In particular, some commodity theorists disapprove of central
247. See id. at 417.
248. This position has potentially been bolstered by the recent SEC ruling that bitcoins and
ethers are not securities, and are more like commodities, under US law: see https://www.reuters

.com/article/cryptocurrencies-ether/us-sec-official-says-ether-not-a-security-price-surges-idUS
L1N1TG1TF. See Irrera, supra note 228.
249.

KARL ELSTER,

,,KALFKRAFT" UND ,,GELTUNG"

NATIONALOKONOMIE UND STATISTIK 243,

DES GELDES,

115

JAHRBUCHER FLIR

247 (1920) (Ger).

250. See S.P. ALTMANN, ZUR DEUTSCHEN GELDLEHRE DES XIX JAHRHUNDERTS',
ENTWICKLUNG

DES

DEUTSCHEN

VOLKSWIRTSCHAFTSLEHRE

IM

XIX

(Leipzig 1908) (Ger.), translatedin HOWARD SYLVESTER
1905 1933 25 (Harvard University Press, 1936).
251. See Bell, supra note 235, at 159-60.

FESTGABE FLR SCHILMOLLER 33

DIE

JAHRHUNDERT,
ELLIS,

GERMAN MONETARY THEORY

252. See generally, CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COIN,
1 (Oxford University Press, 2015).
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banks' position at the top of the hierarchy and advocate a form of monetary
competition.253 These ideas have also found purchase among VC advocates
who see the entry of VCs into the payments (and possibly monetary) system
as an opportunity to force competition even against the political power that
bolsters central banks' position at the top of the hierarchy.254 Thus, VCs
potentially break in through the conceptual back door noticed earlier.
The first point to make is that the state monopoly over money creation is
weaker than some textbook accounts suggest. As stated above, the vast
majority of the broad money supply is created by private commercial banks
taking deposits and/or making loans; broad money's link to public authority
is through commercial banks' holding of fractional reserves of central bank
money (cash and central bank accounts) and the central bank's role as lender
of last resort to commercial banks in crisis. (Again, on some strict legal
definitions, this broad money is not 'money' at all-but, as we have discussed
above, such a definition is hardly practical and is increasingly difficult to
defend.) The replacement of cash as the main medium of payment increases
this trend.
Hayek's theory of the denationalization of money and free competition
between private issuers of money is particularly important to understanding
the potential impact of VCs (and the ambitions of many VC innovators).255
Hayek advocated the free choice in currency, opening up the provision of
currency to competition from both the private sector and from foreign
issuers of currency. 256 According to Hayek, the value of the currencies could
be related to a rule (different from a monetary base) such as convertibility to
a basket of commodities.257 In a system of free banking, there would be no
need for a central pool of reserves, as an individual commercial bank would
253. See LAWRENCE H. WHITE, COMPETING MONEY SUPPLIES http://www.econlib.org/
library/Enc/CompetingMoneySupplies.html (last visited Jan 27, 2019).
254. See JESUS FERNANDEZ-VILLAVERDE & DANIEL SANCHES, CAN CURRENCY COMPETITION
WORK? 42 (2018).
255. Hayek prefaces his essay at page 13 with the observation that it is 'hopeless' to search for a

politically feasible solution to 'what is technically the simplest problem, namely to stop
inflation.' See F.A. Hayek, DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY THE ARGUMENT REFINED 13
(The Institute of Economic Affairs, 3rd ed. 1990).
256. See id. at 85.
257. Hayek's proposals were clearly defined in Denationalisation of Money in 1976. See F.A.
HAYEK, DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY (The Institute of Economic Affairs 1976). Though
his concern about this subject goes back to 1937. See F.A. HAYEK, MONETARY NATIONALISM
AND INTERNATIONAL STABILITY (The Graduate Institute of International Studies, 1937). Or,
even before, as one of his students at the London School of Economics, Vera Smith, published
in 1936 The Rationale of Central Banking. See VERA C. SMITH, THE RATIONALE OF CENTRAL
BANKING AND THE FREE BANKING ALTERNATIVE (Liberty Press, 1936), paying special
attention to the role of note-issuing. Hayek's argument was "refined" (according to his own
words in 1978. See F.A. HAYEK, DENATIONALISATION OF MONEY (The Institute of Economic
Affairs, 2nd ed. 1978), becoming more radical, envisioning private fiat monies; and redefined in
1986 ("Market Standards for Money"), with a more realistic view on the impracticability of
some aspects of his proposals, at least in a near future.
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keep its own reserves, and be responsible for the convertibility of its own8
note and deposit-liabilities.25s
The development of VCs, such as Bitcoin, is a modern example of
competition in the provision of currency. As discussed earlier, a key
motivation for this cryptocurrency is to place the process of money creation
beyond the reach of central banks, thus challenging their monopoly of
currency issue and providing an alternative (some argue cheaper and more
efficient) means of exchange and payment than those offered by banks and
card companies. 2 9 As noted, the VC movement is strongly influenced by
libertarian ideas about spontaneous private ordering and a skepticism
towards state control generally, which translates to skepticism about central
bank monetary policy.260 On this view, privately issued VCs should
successfully compete with the existing monetary system or at least provide a
diverse market of private currencies to which individuals and firms can turn
as an alternative.261
In this context, is it important to note that central banks' role is currently
the subject of a crisis of societal legitimacy, as non-majoritarian institutions

258. The free banking proposals however raise major economic issues and complex problems,
in terms of stability, sufficiency and other factors, which exceed the scope of this study. An
additional difficulty in assessing the practical success of these theories is the lack of sufficient
evidence supporting their arguments. For a comprehensive study of the free banking cases, see
KLRT SCHULER, THE WORLD HISTORY OF FREE BANKING: AN OVERVIEW (Routledge, 1992).
However, the often-cited historical experience of Scotland, from 1716 to 1845, widely surveyed
by White, was not that stable and successful, according to Goodhart. See Charles A.E.
Goodhart, The Two Concepts of Money: Implications for the Analysis of Optimal Currency Areas, 14
EUR. J. POL. ECON. 407, 407 (1998). Among other representatives of the new generation of the
free banking school, the work by White, Glasner and Selgin has been significant. See L.H.
WHITE, FREE BANKING IN BRITAIN: THEORY, EXPERIENCE AND DEBATE 1800-1845 (The Inst.

of Econ. Affairs, 2nd ed. rev. and ext'd, 2008) (1984) (defining 'free banking' as 'the system
under which there are no political restrictions on the business of issuing paper currency
convertible into full-bodied coin.');

LAWRENCE H. WHITE, COMPETITION AND CURRENCY:
ESSAYS ON FREE BANKING AND MONEY (New York University Press, 1989); see also GEORGE A.
SELGIN, THE THEORY OF FREE BANKING (Cato Inst., RDowman & Littlefield, 1988); DAVID
GLASNER, FREE BANKING AND MONETARY REFORM (Cambridge University Press, 1989).

259. For a currency that is not backed by any central authority, Bitcoin's value lies in people's
confidence to use it. But trust is built over time. As reported in the Financial Times of
February 26, 2014, following fears of $400 million theft after Bitcoin's oldest exchange, Mt
Gox, went dark, some Bitcoin advocates said that they are building the towers and bridges of
tomorrow's finance, and that they put themselves at risk in doing so. See Ruairidh Villar,
Sophie Knight & Brett Wolf, Bitcoin Exchange Mt. Gox Goes Dark in Blow to Virtual Currency,
REUTERS (Feb. 25, 2014, 8:21 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mtgox-website/bitcoinexchange -mt-gox-goes-dark-in-blow-to-virtual -currency-idUSBREA1 007920140226; see also
Wolfgang Miinchau, Our Flawed FinancialSystem is Reflected in Bitcoin, FINANCIAL TIMES (Mar.
3 2014); John Gapper, Bitcoin Needs to Grow Out of its Obsessive Adolescence, FINANCIAL TIMES
(Mar. 13, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/4407b284-a9d0-11e3-8bd6-00144feab7de.
260. See Goodhart, supra note 258, at 425.
261. See id.
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in an increasingly populist political environment.262 In Europe, populist
resistance to central bank independence is also aligned with anti-European
movements. 263 VCs are thus intervening in European politics at a
particularly delicate time.
While the idea of monetary competition is a respectable intellectual
position, and while there is already a great diversity in the money supply,
these private monies still fall within the umbrella of the official monetary
system. Mature, if not completely effective, oversight and control is
exercised by institutions invested with public authority, including central
banks, prudential regulators, and capital markets regulators. The entire
volume of broad money is prima facie taxable.264 In our view, a proliferation
of unsanctioned private currencies antagonistic to this system would be
inimical to the Eurosystem and parasitic on the states in which their users
reside, to the extent that users attempt to insulate their VC transactions and
holdings from regulation and taxation. As noticed earlier, the simplicity of
the algorithm behind the computer system at the heart of Bitcoin (a fixed
formula to control the supply of Bitcoins) contrasts with the complexity of
economic policymaking and human behavior, not to mention the inherent
vulnerabilities of Bitcoin and the need to comply with anti-money
laundering legislation and other rules governing payments made adopting
265
this new math-based currency.
3.

VCs as Securities in Harmonized European Law

The next conceptual problem is that the definition of securities is less
straightforward than it appears, especially in the European context where the
term is defined differently in different languages, against the background of
national legal systems. As Castellano notes, the concept of securities is itself
complex, implying aspects of investment, negotiability, and value.266 But
different legal systems use different terms (e.g. valuers mobilitrs/titres
financiers, Wertpapiere, securities, etc.) to denote this complex concept. 267
The definition of each national term is colored not only by the etymology of
the term chosen, but also by the unique history and systemic structure of the
legal system in question.268 This is especially the case in the Civilian
262. See Charles Goodhart & Rosa Lastra, Populism and Central Bank Independence, 29 OPEN
ECON. REV. 49, 55 (2018).
263. Id. at 51.
264. See Omri Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS

38, 45 (2013).

265. For a recent discussion of some of the problems associated with Bitcoin, see inter alia,
John Authers, Time to Take the Bitcoin Bubble Seriously, FIN.T ES (Dec. 11, 2013); John Gapper,
Bitcoin is far more than a Currencyfor Speculators, FIN. TIES (Feb. 5, 2014); Jean-Pierre Landau,
Beware the Mania for Bitcoin, the Tulip for the 21st Century, FIN. T ES (Jan. 16, 2014).
266. See G.G. Castellano, Towards a General Frameworkfor a Common Definition of "Securities":
FinancialMarkets Regulation in Multilingual Contexts, 17 UNIF. L. REV. 449, 449 (2012).
267. Id. at 456.
268. Id.
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jurisdictions on the Continent, which generally place a high value on
axiomatic fundamental principles and the systemic coherence of the codified
law.269

Different jurisdictions also take different approaches to the task of
definition itself. For example, US law provides an open catalogue of
securities, structured around the economic distinction between debt
securities and equity securities, which emphasizes securities' nature as
negotiable investments.270 The contours of this economic approach have
been fleshed out by judicial development of the extensive but non-exhaustive
list, for example the well-known Howey test. 27' In the UK, by way of
contrast, the Financial Services Act 2000 emphasizes the transferability of
securities, in line with the harmonized European approach, and the relevant
statutory instruments provide a closed catalogue of securities, which
authorized regulatory agencies may amend as needed.272
In the European context, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
2004/39/EC (MiFiD) defines 'transferable securities' as equity securities,
debt securities, and a residual category. 273 This has been transposed into
national law in various ways, using terms endogenous to the relevant
system. 274 Although there is a common conceptual core to all definitions of
securities, the national terms all denote a different (i.e. narrower or broader)
set of financial instruments actually circulating in the market; further, all
have a different position within the law of obligations and the law of
property of the relevant national legal order. Castellano notes that even
harmonized definitions such as those found in MiFiD, the Market Abuse
Directive 2003/6/EC, and the Prospectus Directive 2003/71/EC appear
susceptible of different interpretations among Member States.275 As such,
'the linguistic and conceptual divergences between national legal systems'
are the root of a series of problems that focus attention on the role of legal
harmonization and standardization, fostered respectively by EU
policymakers and International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSCO) standard-setters.2 6
In our view, the majority of VCs are more properly characterized as
speculative assets than as currency, and many should be regulated as
securities. Further, the application of existing statutory definitions to any
given VCs is entirely possible within the canon of interpretation of any given
European legal system. But the differences between the definitions
themselves, and the differences between national legal systems' canons of
interpretation, give rise to the possibility of substantial divergences opening
269. Id. at 479.
270. Id. at 464-65.
271. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
272. Castellano, supra note 266, at 466.
273. Id. at 473.
274. Id. at 463, 466-67.
275. Id. at 474.
276. Id. at 471, 475.
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up in the regulation of any given VC token within Europe-even under
harmonized securities law. This, in turn, increases the risk of jurisdictional
arbitrage and makes the European-level regulation of VCs as cryptoassets
even more important.
D.

REGULATING A REVOLUTION

The Eurosystem is effectively called upon to regulate a revolution in the
design and delivery of financial services. 277 This is not confined to VCs, but
VCs are representative of many of the regulatory challenges raised by
Fintech.278 In our view, this raises a number of challenges for NCBs, the
ECB, and other regulatory bodies. In this section, we discuss (i) the need to
define regulatory tasks clearly within the multilateral Eurosystem, (ii) the
need to address VCs potential for facilitating financial crime and tax evasion,
and (iii) the need to assess the scope for regulatory technology in addressing
the risks posed by VCs and other financial technology innovations by market
participants.
1.

Defining Regulatory Tasks

Perhaps one of the major difficulties facing the Eurosystem in the context
of VCs is the definition of regulatory tasks. ECB President Draghi took the
position (in the Q&A session of the last meeting of the Committee
Economic and Monetary Affairs) that it is not part of the ECB's role to
regulate VCs such as Bitcoin, and that the ECB would lack the competence
to prohibit or regulate VCs such as Bitcoin.279 In his answer, President
Draghi took a functional approach, by first asking what material risks VCs
pose to economy based on (i) size, (ii) user acceptance, and (iii) impact on the
real economy. 80 All three, he opined, indicated it was premature to consider
Bitcoin as a means of payment, and therefore premature to regulate VCs as
such. The ECB would need to consider the matter further with the benefit
of analysis and discussion.8, Generally, he said, the ECB's main focus was
on cyber risks associated with VCs rather than on the systemic challenges
posed by VCs themselves.282
It is necessary for the ECB and the NCBs of the Eurosystem, the
regulatory and supervisory agencies involved in the regulation of crypto
assets/VCs in the Eurosytem, and other NCBs and competent institutions
277. See Dirk A. Zetzsche et al., Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to Smart
Regulation, 23

FORDHAM J.

CORP. & FIN. L. 31 (2017).

278. See Douglas W. Arner et al, FinTech, RegTech, and the Reconceptualization of Financial
Regulation, 37 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 371, 376 (2017).
279. EC Audiovisual Service, LIVE EP Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs Monetary
Dialogue with Mario DRAGHI, President of the European Central Bank, EC (Sept. 25, 2017),
https://ec.europa.eu/avservices/video/player.cfm?sitelang=en&ref=1143 771.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
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within the ESCB/EU at large to identify their respective roles in relation to
VCs as the space evolves, and to ensure that there are no gaps. Again, this is
rendered more difficult by the degree of indeterminacy in the concepts of
money and currency, on the basis of which regulatory competence within
the Eurosystem-and within Member States-is distributed.
As we have noted, strict legal definitions of money often take legal tender
status as their point of departure and stress the physical nature of bank notes
and coins as physical moveable objects.283 Thus, for the purposes of the law
of property, money is often treated as a tangible, moveable property.284 This
excludes commercial bank book money from the core of the legal definition
of money, which is difficult from an economic perspective, because bank
deposits are the major part of the money supply (M1), and the fact that
banks are engaged in the process of private money creation provides a
monetary rationale for banking regulation.285 This does not place us
particularly well for assessing when any alternative payment instrument
crosses the threshold, as it were, and falls within the sphere of competence of
the ECB or an NCB.286 Equally, central bank reserves need definition
within the legal framework, but this is rendered difficult given the
composition of such reserves and, in recent years, the growth of sovereign
wealth funds in some jurisdictions.
The problem would appear to be one of how to keep tabs on the changing
landscape without dedicating a disproportionate amount of resources to the
task. In our view, it is essential that the different NCBs and regulatory
agencies work together with the ECB to share knowledge and analyses of
VCs as the market evolves. The reports and whitepapers currently
published by some NCBs and national regulatory agencies as well as by the
IMF and BIS are, in our view, a helpful development.28r
2.

FinancialCrime and Tax Evasion

Another important, specific challenge is to ensure that financial
innovations do not provide new means for financial crime and tax evasion.
VCs could provide payment rails that circumvent Know Your Customer
283. Monetary and Capital Markets, Legal, and Strategy and Policy Review Departments,
Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations 16, SDN/16/03 (Jan. 2016).
284. Id.

285. Id.
286. See Goodhart & Lastra, supra note 262, at 58, 62.
287. See, e.g., Bank for International Settlements (BIS): Committee on Payments and Market

Infrastructures, Central Bank Digital Currencies (Mar. 2018), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/
d174.pdf; Monetary and Capital Markets, Legal, and Strategy and Policy Review Departments,
supra note 283; IMF, Monetary Poliy in the DigitalAge, Finance & Development (June 2018);
Bank of England [BoE], The Economics of Digital Currencies, Quarterly Bulletin (2014); Bank of
England [BoE], Innovations in Payment Technologies and the Emergence of Digital Currencies,
Quarterly Bulletin (2014); Paolo Siciliani, Competition for Retail Deposits Between Commercial
Banks and Non-Bank Operators:A Two-Sided Platform Analysis (Bank of England [BoE], Working
Paper No. 728, May 2018).
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(KYC) and Anti-Money Laundering (AML) measures. 288 Traditional KYC
and AML measures are aimed not at criminals directly, but at financial
intermediaries; by disintermediating financial services, VCs deprive these
measures of a subject on which to bite.
More generally, VC payments are (to a greater or lesser extent)
anonymous, which makes detection, detection, investigation, and
prosecution of ordinary crimes more difficult. This is evident in the use of
VCs for illicit activities including fraud, narcotics, child pornography, arms
dealing, and terrorism in recent years. 289 Examples such as the Silk Road
marketplace show that anonymity is not complete, and law enforcement
measures can still be effective to identify individuals and discourage illicit
online activity.290 But these measures are generally ex post investigative
measures taken under some police power rather than ex ante measures taken
by financial regulators.291 They are not, in our view, a suitable replacement
for KYC and AIL procedures.
VCs may also help to facilitate tax evasion by providing virtual tax
havens.292 This underscores the direct challenge VCs pose to national
sovereignty, as they may undermine the tax base even while their users enjoy
the benefits provided with tax revenues. 293 In light of recent public scandals
and the public dissatisfaction with corporate tax evasion, and to the extent
the money supply relies on the sale of government debt underwritten by
governments' power to tax, the tax implications of VCs should be recognized
as having potentially systemic importance.
3.

The Role of Regulatory Technology

Regulatory Technology (Regtech) is the use of novel Information and
Communications Technology (ICT) in monitoring, reporting, and
compliance.294 To date, most innovations in Regtech have been the result of
players in the financial industry creating digital tools to enhance their
compliance and reduce the costs of compliance.29 But technology also
allows regulators to take a more proportionate risk-based approach where
access to and management of data enables more granular and effective
supervision of markets and market participants, promising better outcomes

and lower

costs.

29 6

Andy Haldane, Chief Economist of the Bank of England, presented in
2014 the vision of a real-time flow of financial data in an information system
288. Monetary and Capital Markets, Legal, and Strategy and Policy Review Departments, supra

note 283, at 27.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 28.

292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

See Marian, supra note 264.
Id. at 43 -45.
Arner et al., supra note 278, at 373.
Id. at 374.
Id. at 375.
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as we measure weather systems and Internet traffic.297 While progress to
date has been incremental, some commentators argue that we are
approaching a paradigm shift in financial regulation as the volume of
financial transactions and data increase (for example, as algorithmic trading
by data driven agents increases), and as the financial markets become still
more globalized.298 In our opinion, Regtech tools will be an essential
component in the regulatory response to VC and associated developments,
such as smart contracts (i.e., self-executing code that embodies and in some
cases purports to displace the traditional agreement between
counterparties).299
In our view, the Eurosystem should play an active role in encouraging
Regtech solutions that help to coordinate the monitoring of VC-based
financial activity across the European Union and the Eurozone. For
example, as the IMF's Christine Lagarde recently argued, it may be
necessary to fight fire with fire by exploring regulatory applications of DLT
to maintain oversight of VC-based activity.300
IV.

Central Bank Issued Virtual Currencies

In recent months, a number of central banks in Europe and elsewhere
have published analyses of the reasons for and against issuing VCs
themselves, and explored the shape that CBVCs might take.301 The prospect
of central bank issued VCs raises particular questions in the ESCB and in the
Eurosystem. In this section, we briefly discuss (i) the reasons for which
central banks might wish to issue a DLT-based VC, (ii) the design features
that central banks would consider when deciding what kind of CBVC to
issue, and (iii) the distinct issues raised by CBVC in the Eurosystem context.
Yermack and Raskin rightly stress that competition between official
currency and private money is not new, whether in the form of commodities
30 2
As
performing monetary functions or, more commonly, foreign currency.
outlined above, there is a school of thought within macro-economics that
evaluates monetary competition of this sort as a salutary influence on the
monetary system, for example, by imposing a market-based form of
297. Andrew G. Haldane, 'Managing Global Finance as a System' (Exec. Dir. and Chief
Economist of the Bank of England [BoE], Speech Given at Maxwell Fry Annual Global Finance
Lecture, Birmingham University, Managing Global Finance as a System (Oct. 29 October,
2014).
298. Arner et al., supra note 278, at 376.
299. Monetary and Capital Markets, Legal, and Strategy and Policy Review Departments, supra

note 283, at 23.
300. Christine Lagarde, Addressing the Dark Side of the Crypto World, IMF BLOG: INSIGHTS AND
ANALYSIS ON ECONOMICS & FINANCE (Mar. 13, 2018), https://blogs.imf.org/2018/03/13/
addressing-the -dark-side-of-the-crypto-world/.
301. Max Raskin & David Yermack, Digital Currencies, Decentralized Ledgers, and the Future of
Central Banking 10 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 22238, 2016).
302. Id. at 5.
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discipline on central banks.303 Part of the relevance of CBVC is the impact
on a long-running macro-economic debate between advocates of free
banking and advocates of a narrowing of the money supply through a
reduction of the systemic role of commercial bank money creators through
deposit taking and lending.304 Although the impact of a CBVC on the
monetary system as it stands would differ according to the design features of
the CBVC, in general it is fair to see proposals for CBVC as a tool for
central banks to fight fire with fire as discussed above, to increase the
functionality of central bank money and bolster public confidence in it.305
A.

REASONS FOR CBVC

We perceive four main reasons why central banks might choose to launch
a VC scheme, each with different motivations and each with different
implications.
The first, and most obvious reason, is that the use of cash is declining in
many jurisdictions as electronic payment methods have become more safe
and convenient.306 This is evident, for example, in the Swedish Riksbank ekrona project.307 Sweden leads the world's economies in the replacement of
cash with digital payment systems, including the 'Swish' platform.308 As
individuals and firms cannot generally hold accounts with the central bank,
cash is the only way that they can hold central bank liabilities.309 To the
extent that it is considered desirable for individuals and firms to have direct
access to central bank liabilities, there are good reasons for central banks in
economies leading the way to cashless payment systems to issue VC tokens
directly accessible to the public. But as the BIS Markets Committee notes,
this need should be considered well in light of the available retail payment
303. Id. at 5-6.
304. Id. at 13.
305. Id. at 5.
306. See Sveriges Riksbank, The Riksbank's E-Krona Project: Action Plan for 2018 (Dec. 2017)
(Swed.).
307. See id. at 2 (stating that one reason why the Riksbank wants to investigate the possibility of
introducing an e-krona is that the use of cash in Sweden has been declining steadily over a long
period of time. At the same time, the Riksbank has the statutory task of providing Sweden with
banknotes and coins, households are using cash less and less and the private sector is reducing
the general public's access to, and the usability of, notes and coins. This means that ultimately,
private agents may determine the access to central bank money and payment methods. In
addition to the Riksbank's obligation to supply cash, the starting point for this project is the
Riksbank's task of maintaining price stability and promoting a safe and efficient payment system
in a new digital environment.); Sveriges Riksbank, The Riksbank's E-KronaProject: Report 1 (Sept.
2017) (Swed.), https://www.riksbank.se/globalassets/media/rapporter/e-krona/2017/rapport-ek
rona uppdaterad_170920 eng.pdf.
308. Morten Bech & Rodney Garratt, Central Bank Cryptocurrencies,BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW
64 (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r qtl709f.pdf.
309. Id. at 57.
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products offered by the private sector, 310 and, depending on how it was
introduced, a CBVC could potentially cause systemic problems for the
monetary system by negatively affecting the desirability of commercial bank
book-money.
The second reason is that central banks currently provide extensive
settlement and clearing services for commercial banks, and a CBVC could be
used to increase the efficiency of this service with significant costs savings.3"
In a similar vein, this type of CBVC could be used to increase central banks
seigniorage, which in a modern context, is the difference between interest
earned on securities acquired in exchange for bank notes and the costs of
31 2
producing and distributing those notes.
The third reason relates to extending central banks' monetary policy
toolkit. In particular, CBVC could potentially solve the Zero Lower Bound
(ZLB) problem to encourage spending in the economy during periods of
downturn.33 "A central bank's liabilities define the quantity of so-called
base money in circulation," and the interest rate on central bank money
defines monetary policy because the primary tool used by central banks is
the interest rate on central bank reserves. 314 This tool is exhausted when the
interest rate nears zero, leading central banks to unconventional policy tools
such as QE, where the central bank purchases assets (with newly created
central bank money) to stimulate spending and investment. 31 A CBVC
could remove the ZLB problem because negative interest rates could be
payable on CBVC tokens.316 A CBVC could also provide an alternative to
traditional QE by making it possible for central banks to inject liquidity into
the monetary system not by purchasing securities but by directly increasing
317
the balance of retail CBVC accounts.
These reasons are all subject to the usual disagreement on political and
macro-economic grounds. Some people will favor the idea of directly
accessible central bank liabilities in times of crisis, for example, while others
will stress the risk that demand for CBVC would drive a flight away from
traditional forms of money. It is difficult to discuss these issues in the
abstract, so we will now move on to the design considerations that will shape
any CBVC proposal.
310. Bank for International Settlements (BIS): Committee on Payments
Infrastructures, supra note 287.
311. Raskin & Yermack, supra note 301, at 14.

and Market

312. Id. at 4.
313. See Andrew Haldane, Chief Economist of Bank of England, Speech at Portadown
Chamber of Commerce, Northern Ireland: How Low Can You Go? 13 (Sept. 18, 2015).

314. Id. at 2.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 11.
317. Central Banks Should Consider Offering Accounts to Everyone, THE ECONOMIST, May 26,
2018, available at https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/05/26/centralbanks -should- consider-offering-accounts-to-everyone? fsrc=scn/li/te/bl/ed/centralbanksshould
considerofferingaccountstoeveryonefreeexchange.
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DESIGNING A CBVC

As we have seen, those tasked with designing a VC scheme have a number
of choices to make about the structure and operation of the scheme. In this
section, we present the most important design choices specific to CBVCs. As
in private VC schemes, these choices are not value neutral; they are
informed by the central bank's motivations for considering the launch. In
our view, the most important design choices relate to (i) access, (ii)
anonymity, (iii) availability, and (iv) interest bearing characteristics. Other
design features include the mechanism by which CBVC is transferred, and
whether quantitative limits are imposed on the acquisition and use of CBVC
tokens.318
1. Accessibility
The primary question concerning accessibility is whether the CBVC is
accessible by retail customers (individuals and firms) or only by financial
intermediaries (commercial banks, in particular). In the latter case, CBVC
would be an extension of already ubiquitous central bank electronic money,
i.e., reserves, and its chief purpose would be to operate a RTGS system. 319 A
retail CBVC, on the other hand, would complement or supplant cash as a
retail medium of exchange.320 This design feature therefore informs the
central question of what the CBVC is designed to be: an extension of one of
the existing forms of central bank money (i.e. cash and reserves), or a new,
32
third form of central bank money. '
Accessibility also refers to whether the CBVC can be acquired and
transferred by users at all times or only during business hours, for example.
Currently, central bank reserves are only accessible during business hours,
although this may change in light of the introduction of faster payment
systems generally.322 Choices regarding this feature will be informed by the
other design choices, particularly whether the CBVC is intended to provide
a retail payment system or something more akin to an inter-bank RTGS
system. 323 To the extent that a CBVC scheme is designed to augment the
central bank's monetary policy toolkit, this is another important point of
comparison with central bank's settlement and clearance function, and the
ability of central banks to set interest rates.
318. Bank for International Settlements (BIS): Committee on Payments and Market
Infrastructures, supra note 287.
319. See Jack Meaning et. al, Broadening Narrow Money: Monetary Policy with a Central Bank
Digital Currency 2 (Bank of England, Staff Working Paper No. 724, 2018).
320. Id. at 4.
321. See Michael Kumhof & Clare Noone, Central Bank Digital Currencies Design Principles
and Balance Sheet Implications 4 (Bank of England, Staff Working Paper No. 725, 2018).
322. See Bank for International Settlements (BIS): Committee on Payments and Market
Infrastructures, supra note 287, at 5.
323. Id. at 1, 8.
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Another question is how users purchase CBVC tokens and convert them
into traditional forms of money. If CBVC tokens can be purchased by
individuals using demand deposits, this could precipitate a flight of capital
from broad to narrow money, as retail customers liquidate their deposits
with commercial banks for central bank money. 324 A recent BIS discussion
paper, for example, has warned that such an arrangement could precipitate
runs on traditional lenders, and the disruptive potential of interest-bearing
CBVC would be greater if it competed with short term government debt
and commercial bank liabilities.325 In the Eurozone context, this could
exacerbate liquidity problems, especially in the weaker Eurozone
economies. 326 Certain proposals, for example the models presented by
Kumhof and Noone, envisage a CBVC unit that may not be purchased with
commercial bank liabilities, but only with qualifying securities, particularly
government debt securities.327 Such CBVC units would not be guaranteed
to be convertible back into book-money.32 8 This is one of the core
principles of their proposal for a CBVC.329
2.

Anonymity

Currently, central bank money available to retail users (i.e. cash) is
anonymous, while that available to financial intermediaries (i.e. reserves) is
not.330 Central banks considering a CBVC scheme have to consider the
AML, CTF, and tax evasion implications of the scheme, which speak against
an anonymous CBVC.331
3. Interest Bearing
Perhaps the most important choice in CBVC design is whether the CBVC
bears interest.332 For example, this informs the ability of the CBVC to
address the ZLB problem. The notion of interest-bearing cash equivalents
is novel, but in all use-cases, except for a straightforward digital substitute
for cash, an adjustable interest rate seems necessary to avoid undesirable
disruptions to the broader monetary system. 333 Further questions follow
with regards to how the interest rate is set.
324. Id. at 16.
325. Bank for International Settlements (BIS): Committee on Payments
Infrastructures, supra note 287.
326. See Goodhart & Lastra, supra note 262, at 52.
327. Kumhof & Noone, supra note 321, at 5.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Bank for International Settlements (BIS): Committee on Payments
Infrastructures, supra note 287, at 9-10.
331. Id.
332. Id. at. 6, 10.
333. Kumhof & Noone, supra note 321, at 8.
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Tranfer Mechanism

One question raised in the Swedish e-krona project is whether a CBVC
payment system should (i) store value in a central register and transfer value
between accounts by amending this register, or (ii) store value locally (i.e., in
an app or on a card).334 In other words, should CBVC be an account-based
or an (electronic) note-based payment system?335 The e-krona project
proposes a combination of these two models, as (ii) is more easily
implemented in the short term (and may be more readily used by older
citizens, for example), while (i) is more complex but offers greater
possibilities over the long run, potentially including monetary policy tools.336
The choice of design features will ultimately be a function of (i) the legal
constraints provided by the Eurosystem framework, and (ii) the macroeconomic policy sought to be achieved by the adoption of an ECB issued
VC. In the aggregate, they will have important implications for the future
role of cash and central bank reserves in the monetary system, the policy
tools available to central banks to pursue their legislative mandates, and the
dynamics of interaction between components of the monetary system,
particularly central banks, commercial banks, and fiscal authorities outside
7
central banks.33
The traditional mode of money creation in our current monetary system
is that commercial banks create money by lending and taking deposits but
holding only a fractional reserve of central bank money. 338 Critics do not
trust commercial banks to play this role as money creators and point to their
track-record of causing boom-bust cycles in the economy. 339 Some people
will favor the idea of directly accessible central bank liabilities in times of
crisis, for example, while others will stress the risk that demand for CBVC
would drive a flight away from currency etc. And CBVC could be liable to
political (including populist political) abuse.340 It is worthwhile to point out
that CBVCs are not the only development in the debate about money
creation. The failed referendum in Switzerland on June 10, 2018, regarding
the Vollgeld (sovereign money) proposals-that would have banned
commercial banks from creating money through their lending operationsgo to the root of the constitutional role of central banks as the monopoly
providers of national currency. 341 Under Vollgeld, the amount of money
injected in the economy would have been overseen by the central bank. As a
proposal to abolish the fractional reserve banking, Vollgeld resembles the
334. Riksbank, supra note 307, at 19, 21.
335. See Rogers, supra note 176, at 1254.
336. Riksbank, supra note 307, at 5.
337. See Michael D. Bordo & Andrew T. Levin, Central Bank Digital Currency and the Future of
Monetary Policy 2 (Hoover Inst. Econ., Working Paper No. 17104, 2017).
338. See Ralph Atkins, Radical Reform: Switzerland to Vote on Banking Overhaul, FIN. TIMES (May

28, 2018).
339. Id.

340. See generally Goodhart & Lastra, supra note 262.
341. See Atkins, supra note 338.
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one-hundred percent reserve banking system advocated by Irving Fisher in
the 1930s.342
The place of any proposed CBVC, and its impacts on the existing
monetary system, depend on the concrete design features of the CBVC
scheme. Bech and Garrat combine conventional taxonomies of money to
yield a model structured around four properties: (i) issuer (central bank or
other), (ii) form (electronic or physical), (iii) accessibility (universal or
limited), and (iv) transfer mechanism (centralized or decentralized/peer-topeer).343 This provides a graphic framework within which CBVC schemes
can be placed and compared.344
C.

CBVCs

IN THE EUROSYSTEM

The prospect of CBVCs raise issues in the Eurosystem in relation both to
the Eurosystem's money creation and oversight role.
1.

CBVCs Issued in the Eurosystem

The main question that arises in the context of CBVCs in the Eurosystem
is one of competence-of who is authorized to issue CBVC tokens. In 2017,
certain officials within the Estonian government announced plans to launch
an 'Estcoin' as a national VC pegged to the euro. 345 These plans were,
however, disclaimed by the governor of the Estonian central bank, Ardo
Hansson.346 The proposal met with stiff opposition from ECB President
Draghi, who in September 2017 said that: "no member state can introduce
its own currency ...The currency of the euro zone is the euro." 347 In light
of this pushback from the ECB, recent reports are that the Estonian
government is amending-but not abandoning-its plans for an Estcoin.348
Instead of a VC issued to Estonians, the plan seems to be to issue VC units
to members of the country's e-Residency program. 349 Officials have been
cited as saying that, while the planned Estcoin might still provide some
35 0
payment services, it would not be a national cryptocurrency.
342. See id.; see also Bank of England [BoE], Money Creation in the Modern Economy 15, Quarterly
Bulletin (2014).
343. Bech & Garratt, supra note 308, at 55.

344. Id.
345. See e.g., Kaspar Korjus, We're Planning to Launch Estcoin-and That's Only the start,
(Dec. 18, 2017) (Est.), https://medium.com/e-residency-blog/were-planning-tolaunch-estcoin-and-that-s-only-the -start- 31 Oaba7 f3 790.
346. Ott Ummelas, Estonia Scales Down Plan to Create National Cryptocurrency, BLOOMBERG
(June 1,2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-01/estonia-curbs-cryptocur
rency-plan-that-drew-rebuke -from-draghi?srnd=cryptocurriences.
MEDIUM

347. Francesco Canepa, ECB's DraghiRejects Estonia's Virtual Currency Idea, REUTER'S (Sept. 7.
2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ecb-bitcoin-estonia/ecbs-draghi-rejects-estoniasvirtual -currency-idea-idUSKCN 1 B12B1.
348. Ummelas, supra note 346.

349. Id.
350. Id.
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President Draghi's position seems, in our view, rightly to assume that a
35
central bank issued VC would qualify as a currency, properly so called. '
The issue of currency in the Eurozone is regulated by Article 108 TFEU,
which provides that the ECB has the exclusive right to issue euro
banknotes.352 In our view, this would include e-euro VC tokens. Under the
aegis of the ECB, NCBs could have some delegated authority to issue
CBVC, but not otherwise.353
As Goodhart notes, the design of the Eurosystem attenuates the link
between political sovereignty and fiscal authority, on the one hand, and
money creation, on the other, to an unprecedented degree.354 It is generally
considered desirable to insulate central banks from direct political pressure,
but in the Eurosystem the institutions tasked with money creation and
monetary policy have been removed to a federal European level, while the
main political and fiscal powers remain at the level of the nation state. 355
Indeed, the fact that monetary unification has preceded political unification
in Europe is a historically unprecedented.356 We can see the tensions
inherent in this novel settlement in the Estcoin question, and we expect
further such tensions play out in the future. We would again underscore the
importance of European-level coordination in this area. For currencies
widely used in cross-border transactions, some of the risks raised by CBVCs
(including instability of commercial bank deposit funding from a flight
towards central bank liabilities) are more acute. 357 BIS suggests that
introduction of CBVC in one jurisdiction could adversely affect others, and
that central banks should consider cross-border issues.358
2.

CBVCs Issued in Third Countries

CBVCs issued outside the Eurozone also raise issues of relevance for the
EU at large. One such question could arise in the context of VCs issued by
governments that are unrecognized or that are subject to international
sanctions. For example, the Venezuelan central bank issued a VC called the
'Petro' in early 2018.359 Shortly after, United States President Donald
Trump signed an executive order banning purchases of the Petro on the
basis that it was an attempt to circumvent sanctions.360 For its part, the
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Canepa, supra note 347.
Goodhart & Lastra, supra note 262, at 66.
Id. at 64.
Goodhart, supra note 258, at 409.
Id. at 410.
See Barry Eichengreen, A More Perfect Union? The Logic of Economic Integration, EssAYS

INT'L FIN.,

IN

no. 198, 1996 at 12.

357. Haldane, supra note 313, at 9.

358. Id.
359. Petro, SUPCAVEN (Jan. 30, 2018) (Venez.), https://www.petro.gob.ve/whitepaper-eng

.html.
360. Trump Bans US Purchases of Venezuela's CryptocurrencyPetro, AL
2018),

JAZEERA NEWS

(Mar. 20,

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/tr-ump-bans-purchases-venezuela-cryptocur

rency-petro- 180320094506428.html.
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Venezuelan National Assembly declared the Petro illegal and declared all
obligations entailed in the issue to be null and void.361 In May 2018,
Venezuela and the Palestinian Authority launched a bi-national bank with an
initial injection of petros. 362 President Nicolas Maduro has reportedly
363
offered oil imports at a discount for purchases in the currency.
VCs issued by unrecognized governments or by non-state (e.g. separatist
or terrorist) actors could raise similar questions in the Eurozone. The use of
VCs for illicit activities is well known.364 The issue of VCs by known
terrorist organizations or sanctioned states would present a clearer case for
prohibition and raise questions of responsibility and competence within the
Eurosystem.
V.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the impact of VCs on central banks in the
Eurosystem. Although they generally share the use of DLT as a common
feature, VCs are differentiated both by their technical features and economic
function(s) and will, accordingly, be characterized differently in legal terms.
This requires granular assessment by central banks of the risks and
opportunities presented by any given VC over time. We have drawn a basic
distinction between privately issued VCs and VCs issued by central banks;
while they may share some technical features, these two classes of VCs raise
unique issues. While CBVCs raise questions about regulatory competence
within the Eurosystem, the bulk of our examination has concentrated on
privately issued VCs. As our approach has made clear, economic accounts of
the nature and functions of money are essential to any description of VCs
and monetary policy, but we have focused specifically on the legal aspects of
VCs, money and monetary policy.
Many privately issued VCs pose a direct and intentional challenge to the
monetary system and to central banks. But, in our view, no privately issued
VCs currently pose any serious risks to central banks' money creation role in
the Eurosystem. Further, we do not think that any VC currently in the
market is likely to qualify for 'money status' in the near future. VCs could,
however, create risks to the stability of the financial system if VC markets
361. Press Release, La Asamblea Nacional, AN Declar6 Nula la Emisi6n del Petro y Todas sus
Obligaciones (June 3, 2018) (Venez.), http://www.asambleanacional.gob.ve/noticias/_an-decla

ro-nula-la-emision-del-petro-y-todas -sus-obligaciones.
362. Jose Antonio Lanz, Venezuela and Palestine Approve Binational Millionaire 'Petro Fund,'
WORLD NEWS (May 8, 2018), https://ethereumworldnews.com/venezuelapalestine-find-petro/.
363. Shine Jacob & Dilasha Seth, Venezuela Offers India 30% Discount on Crude but with
Cryptocurrency Rider, Bus. STANDARD (Apr. 29, 2018), https://www.business-standard.com/
article/markets/venezuela-offers -india- 30-discount-on-crude-but-with-cryptocurrency-rider118042900018_1.html.
ETHEREUM

364. See e.g., Ankit Panda, Cryptocurrenciesand National Security, COUNCIL
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[CFR] (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/cryptocurrencies-and-nationalsecurity.
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continue to grow at the current pace and continue to interact and entangle
with the regulated financial system. The unregulated nature of VCs, and the
dominance of quasi-anonymous VC schemes, also raises challenges in terms
of AML, terrorism financing, and tax evasion. Other traditional regulatory
concerns, such as consumer/investor protection, avoidance of market
manipulation and transparency are also at stake.
Further, if the VC market continues to grow, central banks such as the
ECB may face challenges in their monetary policy role as a large category of
money-like instruments could be out of their oversight and control. The
policy of 'wait and see' is properly risk-oriented, but the need for action
must be evaluated constantly in light of changing circumstances. Changes
can be very rapid, so a certain level of preparedness is necessary on the basis
of the precautionary principle. Furthermore, the cross-border nature of
VCs suggests the need for a harmonized European regulatory approach.
All of these questions, we have argued, are rendered more difficult by the
raft of conceptual challenges raised by the existence of VCs, particularly
relating to the definition of concepts including 'money' and 'securities,' the
relation of these concepts as a matter of legal and economic theory, and the
methodological problem of squaring legal and economic approaches to
monetary theory itself.
In general, VCs require a pro-active regulatory response and that certain
VCs could warrant prohibition now or in the future. Ideally, a harmonized
European approach to the regulation of VCs is desirable to prevent
regulatory arbitrage by market participants and a 'race to the bottom' by
national regulators. Financial regulation generally follows crises. In our
view, it would be preferable for regulators at the European level to act
before any VC-based crisis in order to shape the VC market as it evolves and
so avoid disruption in the (regulated) financial economy or the real
economy. This might include (i) banning certain classes of VC outright, (ii)
imposing regulations on the issue and governance of others, and (iii)
launching applications of the same underlying technology in order to
displace private VC schemes. While it is imperative to avoid stifling
innovation in the financial services industry, we do think that VCs require a
pro-active regulatory response and that certain VCs could warrant
prohibition now or in the future. Regulatory tools such as the creation of
'sandboxes' provide a middle road and have been used successfully in a
number of jurisdictions. Ideally, a harmonized European approach to the
regulation of VCs is desirable to prevent regulatory arbitrage by market
participants and a 'race to the bottom' by national regulators.
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